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OPT-IN GOVERNMENT: USING THE INTERNET
TO EMPOWER CHOICE-PRIVACY APPLICATION
Malla Pollack+
This is the way the [privacy] ends
This is the way the [privacy] ends
This is the way the [privacy] ends
Not with a bang but a whimper.'
I. THE SUGGESTION: OPT-IN GOVERNMENT
This article proposes a relatively novel model of government
regulation and illustrates how the model might work with
respect to Internet privacy protection for U.S. residents.2  I
suggest "opt-in government" as a practical method to integrate
the democratic concept of voice with the market model of
choice. 3 "Opt-in government" either (i) creates "a safe place" that
persons may enter only if they wish to do so, or (ii) enables a
choice that the so-called private sector has not offered.4 One
+ Visiting Associate Professor, Northern Illinois University, College of Law. My
thanks for helpful comments on earlier versions to Ann Bartow, David E.
Sorkin, and Jonathan Winer. Any errors are my own. [Editor's note: the
following article conforms to THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (16h
ed. 1996)].
1. Thomas Stearns Eliot, The Hollow Men, in IMMORTAL POEMS OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 542 (Oscar Williams, ed., 2d ed. 1960).
2. For a brief explanation as to how this method could address consumer
protection issues, see Malla Pollack, U.S. Perspectives on Consumer Protection in
the Global Electronic Marketplace, Comment P994312 to the Federal Trade
Commission (April 30, 1999), available in <http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/icpw/
comments/pollack.htm>.
3. "Voice" allows individuals to be heard about the conditions of their lives.
"Choice" in the market is merely a theoretical option to decline a proffered
transaction, i.e., "exit." The market may not offer any "choice" that the
"chooser" relishes, even when life requires the chooser to choose something.
Furthermore, the market does not operate on the principle of "one person, one
vote." Individuals with more discretionary income have a greater impact on
available market choices than do individuals with less discretionary income.
See generally ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993)
(discussing "choice," "voice," "exit," and when each is morally appropriate).
4. Some opt-in government strategies fulfill both possibilities. Although
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reason to try the opt-in model is that pure self-regulation does
not work; business requires a strong governmental push.5  Many
6Americans, nevertheless, seem to honor Calvin Coolidge's
aphorism that "the business of America is business. Further,
the federal government appears intent on making the private
sector "lead" in many areas.8 We need a method to combine this
not part of the main model, sufficiently successful ventures started by
government could be privatized later. Privatization, however, creates major
issues outside the scope of this article. Consider, for example, the multiple
complaints about the insularity of Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN) and its predecessors. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Of
Governments and Governance, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 617, 623-32 (1999)
(discussing the lack of effective democratic checks during World Intellectual
Property Organization's (WIPO) trademark/domain name process).
5. For example, as discussed below, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
began its investigation into Internet privacy issues with a strong bias toward
self-regulation, yet quickly called for child-specific and general legislation
because industry response was sluggish, at best. The FTC has also recently
reported that the self-regulating motion picture, music recording, and electronic
game industries routinely target children under 17 as the audience for movies,
music, and games that the industries themselves acknowledge are
inappropriate for children. See FTC Release Report on the Marketing Violent
Entertainment to Children, available in
<http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/09/youthviol.htm> [hereinafter FTC Violence];
see also, e.g., Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation
as a Regulatory Technique, 47 ADMIN. L. REv. 171 (1995). But see, e.g., Sagi
Lizerov, Greenspan's Privacy Solution, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, Sept. 4, 2000, at
93 (arguing that higher interest rates and slower returns in net businesses will
raise entry barriers and, therefore, increase likelihood of privacy self-
regulation).
6. Unless the context clearly shows otherwise, this paper uses "American"
to mean of or pertaining to the United States of America. "United Statesian" is,
unfortunately, not yet acceptable for law review publication.
7. Calvin Coolidge, Speech to Society of American Newspaper Editors,
Washington D.C. (Jan. 1925), available at <http://www.sddt.com/features/
convention/elections/ 1924. htm>.
8. E.g., The White House, A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce
http://www.ecommerce.gov/framework.htm (visited Oct. 23, 2000). The five
principals are:
1. The private sector should lead.
2. Governments should avoid undue restrictions on electronic
commerce.
3. Where governmental involvement is needed, its aim should be to
support and enforce a predictable, minimalist,
consistent and simple legal environment for commerce.
4. Governments should recognize the unique qualities of the Internet.
5. Electronic Commerce over the Internet should be facilitated on a
global basis.
Id. at 1. The 2000 Republican Platform also supported business leadership:
Government also has a responsibility to protect personal privacy, which
is the single greatest concern Americans now have about the
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attitude with taking care of the real business of America-
Americans. 9
II. THE ON-LINE PRIVACY PROBLEM
A. Background
Recently, the FTC recognized that the perceived lack of
privacy 10 on the Internet bothers Americans. Privacy concerns
Information Revolution. Citizens must have the confidence that their
personal privacy will be respected in the use of technology by both
business and government. That privacy is an essential part of our
personal freedom and our family life, and it must not be sacrificed in
the name of progress. At the same time, consumers should have the
benefit of new products, services, and treatments that result from the
legitimate use of data with appropriate safeguards. We applaud the
leadership already demonstrated in this regard by many outstanding
businesses, which are ensuring individuals' privacy in various ways
and promoting public education about the consumer's right to privacy.
The Republican National Committee, The American Dream: Prosperity with a
Purpose (2000 Platform) <http://www.rnc.org/2000/2000platform2> (visited
Oct. 23, 2000). The 2000 Democratic Platform supported on-line privacy, but
did not, at that exact spot, repeat the mantra of business leadership:
While fighting to expand Internet access, [Al Gore] has led the
Administration's efforts to give parents, schools, and communities
effective tools to protect children from inappropriate content on-line. In
particular, Al Gore has focused on the challenge of protecting
Americans' personal privacy on-line as well as the medical and financial
information that can all too easily be intercepted and abused by others.
Al Gore has called for an Electronic Bill of Rights for this electronic
age-including the right to choose whether personal information is
disclosed; the right to know how, when, and how much of that
information is being used; the right to see it yourself; and the right to
know if is accurate.
Democratic National Committee, Prosperity, Progress, and Peace
<http://www.democrats. org/hq/resources/platform/index.htrnl> (visited Sept.
1, 2000).
9. See, e.g., ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS 8-9 ("Neither the
profitability of a nation's corporations nor the successes of its investors
necessarily improve the standard of living of most of a nation's citizens .... The
underlying question concerns the future of American society as distinct from
the American economy.").
10. The FrC accepts the basic principles of the Guidelines on the Protection
of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data. See OECD, Guidelines on
the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data.
<http://www.oecd.fr/dsti/sti/it/secur/act/ prod/pnv-en.htm> (visited Oct. 13,
2000). These principles are notice/awareness, choice/consent,
access/participation, integrity/security, and enforcement/redress. See FTC,
Privacy Online: A Report to Congress, at 7-11 (June 1998), available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/ privacy/ index.html> [hereinafter FTC, Privacy].
20011 655
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impact both of the FTC's missions: promoting American
commerce and protecting American consumers." Even if the
business of America is business, consumer willingness to grow
business to consumer electronic commerce (BtoC)13 by shopping
on the Internet requires, at a minimum, a change in consumer
perceptions.14  In 1995, the FTC began a privacy initiative
dedicated to business self-regulation.' 5 In 1998, however, the
FTC suggested legislation to protect children's on-line privacy.
16
11. Modern international business practices undermine the concept of
"American" commerce. See, e.g., REICH, supra note 9, at 119-70 (explaining
that businesses no longer substantively support their nominal countries of
citizenship); see also, e.g., U.S. Dep't. of Commerce, Digital Economy 2000, at vii
(June 2000), available at <http://www.doc.gov/ ecommerce>.
Paradoxically, although America's IT [information technology] producing
companies are world-class, the United States regularly runs large trade
deficits in IT goods-an estimated $66 billion in 1999. One reason is
that American IT firms more often service foreign customers with sales
from their overseas affiliates than by exports from their U.S. operations.
Id.
12. See FTC, Working for Consumer Protection and a Competitive Marketplace
<http://www.ftc.gov> (visited Oct. 13, 2000) (displaying the slogan and links to
IFTC materials); see also FTC, Vision, Mission and Goals <http://www/ftc.gov/
ftc/misssion.htm> (visited Oct. 14, 2000) ("The Commission seeks to ensure
that the nation's markets function competitively, and are vigorous, efficient, and
free of undue restrictions. The Commission also works to enhance the smooth
operation of the marketplace by eliminating acts or practices that are unfair or
deceptive.").
13. "BtoC ecommerce" means business to consumer electronic commerce.
14. See e.g., FTC, Privacy, supra note 10, at ii (indicating that the FTC's
privacy efforts "have been based on the belief that greater protection of personal
privacy on the Internet will not only protect consumers, but also increase
consumer confidence and ultimately their participation in the online
marketplace"). The European Union is also concerned about consumer
perceptions that deter BtoC ecommerce. See, e.g., Commissioner David Byrne,
Address at the Launch of the 360atlantic Project for Health and Consumer
Protection (Sept. 25, 2000), available at
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/healthconsumer/library/
speeches/speech56_en.html> (addressing the "confidence gap" by encouraging
"best market protections," creating alternative dispute resolution procedures,
and setting jurisdiction in the consumer's home court system).
15. See FTC, Privacy, supra note 10, at 2.
16. See id. at 42 ("In the specific area of children's online privacy ... the
Commission now recommends that Congress develop legislation placing parents
In control of the online collection and use of personal information from their
children."). Congress responded with the Children's Online Privacy Protection
Act of 1998. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (West. Supp. 2000) [hereinafter COPPA].
The FTC then requested comments on the suitability of TRUSTe's children's
privacy seal as a safe harbor under COPPA. See, e.g., FTC, Requests Public
Commvents on TRUSTe Application for COPPA Safe Harbor Status, 5 Electronic
656
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Disappointed by self-regulation efforts, the FTC recommended
more sweeping privacy legislation in May 2000.17 The majority of
the FTC requested that Congress pass technologically-neutral
legislation phrased in general terms, with the terms to be fleshed
out by later FTC action.' 8  However, Commissioner Orson
Swindle dissented and continued to argue that allowing
informed consumers to vote using their computer mice could
better solve any problem.' 9  Since 1999, major on-line
businesses have showed the FTC a new framework for self-
regulation, providing additional arguments against the
enactment of legislation.2 °
Other governance models exist. For example, in 1995 the
European Union (EU) issued a sweeping top-down Directive on
Com. & L. (BNA), No. 35, at 916 (Sept. 13, 2000). Recent American privacy
legislation includes the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which covers, among other
things, consumers' financial information. See Pub. Law. No. 106-102, 113 Stat.
1338, 1340 (1999). The FTC has requested comments on regulations to
effectuate this act. See,. e.g., FTC, in Preliminary Action Seeks Comment on
Privacy Safeguards for Forthcoming Rule, 5 Electronic Com. & L. (BNA), No. 35,
at 914 (Sept. 13, 2000).
17. See FTC, Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic
Marketplace: A Report to Congress, at 36-38, available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/index.html> [hereinafter FTC, Privacy II]. Besides
personally identifiable information, the FTC also has investigated on-line
profiling. See Dept. of Com. & FTC, Public Workshop on Online Profiling (Nov. 8,
1999), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/index.htm> [hereinafter
Profiling Workshop]; see also FTC, Online Profiling: A Federal Trade Commission
Report to Congress, Part 2, available at <http.www.ftc.gov/privacy/index.html>
[hereinafter Online Profiling Part 2]; FTC, Online Profiling: A Federal Trade
Commission Report to Congress, Part 1, available at
<http.www.ftc.gov/privacy/index.html> [hereinafter Online Profiling Part 1];
Prepared Statement of the FTC On "Online Profiling: Benefits and Concerns"
Before the Senate Comm. on Corn., Sci. and Transp., 106th Cong. (2000)
(prepared statement of Jodie Bernstein, Director of the Bureau of Consumer
Protection of the Federal Trade Commission), available at
<http: //www.ftc.gov/privacy/index.html> [hereinafter Benefits/Concerns];
Statement of Commission[er] Orson Swindle Concurring in Part and Dissenting in
Part to Prepared Statement of the FTC On Online Profiling: Benefits and Concerns
Before the Senate Comm. on Corn., Sci. and Transp., 106th Cong. (2000),
available at <http://www. ftc.gov/prlvacy/index.html> [hereinafter Swindle on
Profiling].
18. See FTC, Privacy II, supra note 17, at 37.
19. See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Orson Swindle in Privacy
Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace: A Report to
Congress, at 4-5 (May 2000), available at
<http://www.fts.gov/05/2000/05/index.htm> [hereinafter Swindle Statement].
20. See Online Profiling Part 2, supra note 17, at 4 (discussing the National
Advertising Initiative and pending federal legislation).
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Data Protection," requiring member states to enact privacy
protection laws both enforceable by individual lawsuits with
monetary remedies22 and backed by one or more public
authorities (i.e., government bodies) with investigative,
23adjudicative, and regulatory power. Member states were also
required to halt transfer of personal data to third countries
lacking adequate data privacy protections." As a result of the
EU directive, American businesses pressured the U.S.
government to protect transborder data flow between pro-privacy
Europe and consumer-beware United States.25  Long
negotiations between the U.S. and the EU on transborder data
flow26 resulted, not in a United States Privacy Agency, but a set
of safe harbor provisions 7 that met the EU's requirements.
These safe harbor provisions are entirely voluntary. If an
American business desires more certainty about the continuity
of data transfer to it from the EU, it may self-certify itself as
21. See Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 24 October 1995 On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and On the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995
O.J. (L281) 31, available at <http:europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/lif/date/ 1995/en_395L046. html> [hereinafter EC Directive].
22. See id., arts. 22-24.
23. See id., art. 28.
24. See id., arts. 25, 26.
25. See, e.g., Industries Clamor for Privacy 'Safe Harbor', INS. REGULATOR,
Nov. 30, 1998, available at 1998 WL 5050155 ("Several financial trade
associations . . . are pressuring the task force on electronic commerce at the
Department of commerce to clarify and provide assurances that U.S.
companies fall within the safe harbors for the European Union data privacy
directive.").
26. See Dep't of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Electronic
Commerce Task Force <http: / /www.ita.doc/gov/td/ecom/menu.html> (visited
Oct. 22, 2000) (providing negotiation documents in reverse chronological order
from November 1998 through July 21, 2000).
27. See Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European
Commission, 65 Fed. Reg. 45,666 (July 24, 2000) (providing full text and
explanatory material); Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to
European Commission; Procedures and Start Date for Safe Harbor List, 65 Fed.
Reg. 56,534 (Sept. 19, 2000) (containing corrections to final documents
published in 65 Fed. Reg. 45,666).
28. See Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of
the protection provided by the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles and related
Frequently Asked Questions issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce
<http://www.ita.doc/gov/td/ecom/Decision SECGEN-EN.htm> (visited Oct. 21,




conforming to the guidelines. A self-certifying business can
choose between several "adequate" privacy approaches, but none
require it to treat data originating outside of the EU with any
care. 29  In sum, both bottom-up and top-down regulation of
Internet privacy already exist; however, both regulatory models
are problematic for protecting U.S. residents.
B. Top-Down Regulation
1. Theoretical Problems
op-down" regulation suffers from governmental inefficiency;
it is costly and time-consuming. In the fast moving technical
world of the Internet, an enactment may not be promulgated in
time to match the technology in use. Statutory prohibitions may
fail because they consistently emerge only after the harm has
been done and the technology has advanced to other anti-
privacy methods.30  Government, therefore, may be tempted to
force effectiveness by ordering technology to freeze in place, thus
denying the public the benefits of progress. Top-down
regulation also prevents persons from individually choosing to
allow a "harm" that, in their personal opinion, is "harmless., 31 If
some businesses choose to offer free or less costly services in
exchange for information (usually tied to advertising exposure),
29. Because data protection is among "the fundamental rights and freedoms
of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy," the EU may
eventually posit that the Directive covers all citizens or habitual residents of EU
member countries. European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC,
ch.1, art. 1, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31-50, available at <http://eurpoa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/lif/dat/1995/en_395L0046.html>. The safe harbor principles do refer
to "human resources personal information transferred from the EU for use in
the context of an employment relationship." Dep't of Com., Safe Harbor Privacy
Principles Issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce on July 21, 2000,
available at <http: //www.ita.doc.gov/td/ecom/SHPRINCIPLESFINAL.htm>
[hereinafter Safe Harbor Privacy Principles].
30. See FTC, Self-Regulation and Privacy Online: A Report to Congress at 6
(July 1999) [hereinafter FTC, Privacy 11A] ("[S]elf-regulation is the least intrusive
and most efficient means to enforce fair information practices, given the rapidly
evolving nature of the Internet and computer technology.").
31. The Clipper Chip was partially such an attempt. See generally A.
Michael Froomkin, It Came From Planet Clipper: The Battle Over Cryptographic
Key "Escrow," 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 15 (discussing federal government's
attempt to make the relatively insecure Clipper Chip into an encryption
standard); A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the
Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 709 (1995) (same).
20011 659
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 50:647
what is the harm in allowing consumers to accept these offers?
This type of "free service" funded by advertisers is, after all, the
business model of broadcast television and radio.32 Such "free
service" has supported large-scale information distribution on
the Internet.33 Regulating against the exchange may constitute
an unwarranted governmental limitation on personal freedom. 4
32. This article will not discuss the obvious points that (i) government has
regulated broadcast television and radio, and (ii) dish, cable, and other pay-per-
view services may be overpowering the broadcasters.
33. For example, The New York Times will be happy to give you free on-line
access to recent news if, and only if, you share demographic information and do
not object to inhabiting a space shared with banner advertisements. You only
need to provide your demographic information once because the site remembers
you. See The New York Times <http://www.nytimes.com> (visited Aug. 26,
2000). Some information is less costly. Information Please, for example, will let
you search for information without answering any personal questions. Its
privacy policy says that it is not collecting or selling personal information, but
the privacy policy says nothing about who runs the banner advertisements. See
Information Please <http://www.lnfoplease.com/privacy.html> (visited Aug. 26,
2000). Several firms are willing to provide free dial-up Internet service in order
to market advertisements. See David Lake, It's Not Easy Being Free, THE
INDUSTRY STANDARD, Sept. 4, 2000, at 127 (providing statistics). Some
wonderful sites are completely free. I managed to write an article on the then-
pending Collection of Information Anti-Privacy Act before I knew if the bill would
pass because of Congress's Internet site <http://www.thomas.loc.gov>. See
Malla Pollack, The Right to Know?: Delimiting Database Protection at the
Juncture of the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause, and the First
Amendment, 17 CARDOzo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47 (1999). In addition to
government-run services, which have recently been ordered to stop hidden
information retrieval, see OMB, Privacy Policies and Data Collection on Federal
Web Sites (June 22, 2000), available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov>, one can
visit, for example, the San Francisco Fine Art Museum on the Internet. No
questions are asked, and no banner advertisements appear. There is also no
posted privacy policy. See Fine Art Museums of San Francisco
<http://www.famsf.org> (visited Sept. 8, 2000). Some sites may use cookies
inadvertently because some Microsoft server products turn on cookie
technology by default. See Declan McCullagh, Fed's Hands Caught in the
Cookie Jar Violating White House Order, WIRED NEWS, June 20, 2000, at 3.
Advertising alone, furthermore, has proven unable to support many on-line
content suppliers. See, e.g., Hane C. Lee, Can Syndication Save Content?, THE
INDUSTRY STANDARD, Sept. 4, 2000, at 85 ("Last spring's market plunge made it
painfully clear to content companies that ad dollars alone cannot sustain a
business.").
34. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (1978) (stating that the basic
principle of government is "[tihat the only purpose for which power can be
exercised over any member of a civilized community against his will, is to
prevent harm to others"). This argument overlooks the possibility that selling
information, like selling votes, may have societal harm. Removing individually
targeted advertising, furthermore, does not eliminate advertising. Additionally,
one can target advertising without trailing consumers, by considering the host
660
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A government privacy czar raises First Amendment concerns.35
The federal Constitution," after all, sees government (especially
national government) as the proverbial bad guy 37 and is
relentlessly blind to non-governmental "Big Brothers" keeping
watch.38
A recent study reported a strong belief among U.S residents
that the government can track them on the Internet, as well as a
belief that someone was monitoring them on-line.39 The press's
site's content or by paying persons to be "tracked" on-line. E.g., Joshua
Hallford, Web Ratings: Heavy Traffic Ahead, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, Sept. 25,
2000, at 104 (discussing several web-rating firms that compensate individuals
for providing information about their browsing behavior); see also, e.g., Julie E.
Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52
STAN. L. REv. 1373, 1374-77 (2000) (arguing that rhetoric of individual freedom
masks commercial interests, which desire to treat persons as objects).
35. See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The
Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L.
REv. 1, 6-7 (1991) (stating that First Amendment theory assumes that sharing
more information is preferable); The Europeans Take a Hard Line on Data
Privacy, CREDIT CARD NEWS, Apr. 1996, available at 1996 WL 8385684
("Americans are unnerved by the concept of a national data protection agency..
. it would be like setting Big Brother to watch Big Brother .... [SItudies show
that in the U.S., there is a direct correlation between the public's distrust of
government and fears about the abuse of confidential information.") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
36. Some state constitutions do include a right to privacy, including Alaska,
Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, South
Carolina, and Washington. Some of these provisions may create recourse
against non-governmental entities. Cf. Damages for Breaches of Privacy, 65
Fed. Reg. 45679 (July 19, 2000).
37. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 47-48, 51 (1992) (indicating that American colonials were strongly
influenced by the English radicals who "maintainled a] vigil against
government" showing "extreme solicitude for the individual and an equal
hostility to government").
38. Most constitutional limitations are only applicable to "state action."
E.g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483
U.S. 522, 543-48 (1987) (refusing to reach the USOC's allegedly discriminatory
choice of licensees on the ground that the USOC is not a government actor). If
a non-governmental entity is watching, it may be willing to sell the information
to the government or even to share the information for free for the sake of
governmental goodwill. Regardless of the collector's attitude, if the information
exists, the government presumably can order it to be produced under a proper
showing.
39. See CHESKIN RESEARCH, TRUST IN THE WIRED AMERICAS 13 (2000),
available at <http://www.cheskin.com/think/ studies/trust2.html> (using an
11 point scale when 0 means strong disagreement and 10 means strong
agreement, and indicating that the government's ability to monitor received a
7.3 and actual monitoring received a 5.9) (page numbers reference the word
document of the study available at this URL) [hereinafter CHESKIN RESEARCH].
20011
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disclosure of the FBI's Carnivore E-Mail surveillance system
supports such fears,40 as does the recent General Accounting
Office report asserting that many federal government web sites
are not respecting surfers' privacy. 4  Furthermore, generally
worded legislation leaves the highly important details to an
administrative agency. An agency could be captured by the
regulated industry and could (quietly) weaken the controls
through rule making and adjudicative choices. 42  The courts
would likely defer.4
40. See, e.g., Fourth Amendment, 'Sham' Outside Review Concerns Dog FBI's
Carnivore E-Mail Snooper, 5 ELECTRONIC COM. & L. (BNA), No. 35, at 912 (Sept.
13, 2000); see also McCullagh, supra note 33 (reporting that federal agencies
are not complying with White House order not to use cookies on their websites).
41. See U.S. GAO, INTERNET PRIVACY: COMPARISON OF FEDERAL AGENCY
PRACTICES WITH FTC's FAIR INFORMATION PRINCIPLES (Sept. 11, 2000) (on file with
the Catholic University Law Review). The Clinton administration termed the
GAO's document "seriously misleading." Most Federal Web Sites Fail on Privacy
Standards, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2000, available at
<http://www.nytlmes.com/2000/09/17/ technology/ 17 priv.html>.
42. See, e.g., William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium:
Regulatory Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J.
1351, 1356 (1997) (arguing that contemporary negotiated rule making subverts
agency goal of protecting public interest); Bradford C. Mank, Superfund
Contractors and Regulatory Capture, 2 N.Y.U. ENVT'L L.J. 34, 34 (1993) (arguing
that behavior of contractors hired to clean up superfund sites demonstrates
agency capture). But see, e.g., Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation
Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 142-46 (1998)
(arguing that processes used in agency rule making and adjudication are not
well suited to rent seeking by private interests).
43. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-44 (1984) (requiring judicial deference to an agency's construction of a
statute enforced by that agency). As for trusting the FTC, specifically, while
that agency has done some excellent work, it also decided that the cartoon
cigarette spokesanimal Joe Camel was not targeting children, despite
persuasive evidence otherwise. See FTC News, June 7, 1994, at I (announcing
no action decision); see generally, e.g., JAMA, Dec. 11, 1999 (reporting several
research studies showing strong reaction of children to Joe Camel
advertisements). Note that the 1998 Tobacco Settlement includes a
commitment for cigarette companies to stop using non-human cartoon
characters in advertisements as of May 22, 1999. See Joy Johnson Wilson
(National Conference of State Legislators, Director, AFI Health Committee),
Summary of the Attorneys General Master Tobacco Settlement Agreement (March
1999), available at
<http://www.udayton.edu/-health/syllabi/tobacco/summary.htm> (visited
Sept. 13, 2000). The FTC, furthermore, only recently issued its first corrective
advertising order in an adjudicated case since 1975. See 69 U.S.L.W. (BNA)
1140 (Sept. 12, 2000).
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2. Current Status in the United States
4 4
Additional privacy legislation in the United States may be
likely. Congress has jumped on the privacy bandwagon. It
recently enacted both the Children's Online Privacy Protection
Act and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. 46  Many bills that
mention "privacy" were pending at the end of the 1 0 6 "h Congress.
Of these, the Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2000 (Privacy
Act)47 responds to the FTC's May 2000 call for general privacy
legislation . 4  The Privacy Act was introduced in the Senate on
May 23, 2000, and referred to the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation. 9
The Privacy Act does not go far enough, despite its many good
features. The Act opens with findings that declare ground
breaking theoretical rights:
(1) The right to privacy is a personal and fundamental
right worthy of protection through appropriate
legislation.
(2) Consumers engaging in and interacting with
companies engaged in interstate commerce have an
ownership interest in their personal information, as well
as a right to control how that information is collected,
44. In this section, "current" means through the end of the 1 0 6 h Congress.
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (West Supp. 2000). But see ACLU v. Reno, 217
F.3d 162 (3rd Cir. 1999) (affirming preliminary injunction against enforcement
of COPPA).
46. Publ. Law. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1337, Title V (Privacy) (enacted Nov. 12,
1999). The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act covers consumers' financial information.
See id.
47. S. 2606, 106th Cong. §2 (2000).
48. See 146 CONG. REc. S4299, S4301 (daily ed. May 23, 2000) (remarks of
Senator Hollings).
49. See Bill Summary & Status for the 106th Congress for S. 2606,
available at <http://www.thomas.loc.gov>. The Committee and the FTC
cooperated in hearings on Internet privacy and on-line profiling. See press
announcements and hearing reports for June 13, 2000 and hearings dated May
25, 2000 at the Committee's website. See <http://www.senate.
gov/-commerce>. One day of hearings was held on S. 2606 on October 3,
2000. The Committee's web site contains some of the testimony. Because the
Senate seemingly orchestrated the bill in conjunction with the FTC, the FTC's
July 2000 acceptance of new advertising self-regulation principles might have
herald the bill's untimely death even though a majority of FTC commissioners
still officially supported legislation to fill self-regulation's gaps. See infra notes
97-99 and accompanying text (discussing NAI self-regulation); see also OnLine
Profiling Part 2, supra note 17, at 6.
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used, or transferred.5 °
Implementation details do not quite match the theory.
Broadly speaking, if enacted, the Privacy Act would require
consumer opt-in consent to online collection of personally
identifiable information (PII) and opt-out consent for non-
personally identifiable information (non-PII).5 ' Third parties
operating advertising services on host web sites would be bound
52by these limitations. Personally identifiable information would
not be sellable as an asset if its collector enters bankruptcy.
53
Both the FTC and state attorneys general would have standing
to sue violating entities, and private parties would have
individual causes of action for misuse of personally identifiable
information. To encourage discovery of violations, whistle
blowers would be protected from employer retaliation, at least
theoretically.54
The FTC may extend the definition of PII:
The term "personally identifiable information" means
individually identifiable information about an individual
collected online, including:
(A) a first and last name, whether given at birth or
50. S. 2606, at 2 (1), (2). A purist might quibble that subsection (1) may
imply that a "fundamental right" can be limited to the "appropriate legislation"
that manages to get through a pro-business Congress. Additionally, the purist
may argue that a fundamental right to privacy should not be limited to the
commercial field specified in subsection (2). By the way, does "personal
information" include allegedly "anonymous" profiles either kept separate for
each browser address or aggregated? Perhaps Congress's drafting experts are
frightened by the Supreme Court's recent willingness to strike legislation as
beyond Congress's commerce clause power. See United States v. Morrison, 120
S. Ct. 1740 (2000) (finding Violence Against Women Act is void as beyond
Congress' Commerce Clause Power); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996) (abrogating state sovereign immunity in Indian Gaming
Regulation Act is beyond Congress's Commerce Clause Power); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (enacting Gun-Free School Zone Act is beyond
Congress's Commerce Clause power). Perhaps Congress is taking a trick from
the framers of the Constitution and writing about positive powers largely to
limit those powers. See WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN
THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 486-87 (1953). I would argue that the
Internet is an inherently interstate system on which the surfer is performing
interstate movement; therefore, the commerce clause should allow federal
statutes regulating all web sites.
51. Id. at 102, 103.
52. Id. at 102(g), 103(c).
53. Id. at 601.
54. Id. at 301-305. Consumers would also retain certain state law
remedies. See id. at 306.
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adoption, assumed, or legally changed;
(B) a home or other physical address including street
name and name of a city or town;
(C) an e-mail address;
(D) a telephone number;
(E) a Social Security number;
(F) a credit card number;
(G) a birth date, birth certificate number, or place of
birth;
(H) any other identifier that the [Federal Trade]
Commission determines permits the physical or online
contacting55 of a specific individual; or
(1) unique identifiable information that an Internet
service provider, online service provider, or operator of a
commercial website collects and combines with an
identifier described in this paragraph.56
The borderline item missing from this list, unless the FTC
rules include it, is the Internet Protocol address (IP address) of
individual browsers. The extent to which IP addresses are PII is
controversial. Static IP addresses may be nearly as tied to one
person as an email address.57 Certainly, an IP address can be
tied to a specific computer (or human surfer) if personally
identifiable information is submitted; the information collector
simply records both in tandem. Some sites can read the email
address stored in the surfing browser without the human
surfer's knowledge. 8 Presumably, a very interested observer
could tie together multiple sessions by the same person using
different IP addresses by catching the same PHI used with
different IP addresses. An IP address, with variable effort, can
be traced back to a specific computer, which itself may be
strongly related to a specific person, or a small group of persons.
A static IP address is clearly more revealing to a third person
than is a dial-up address provided by an Internet service
55. I would prefer the much broader term "profiling," or even the slightly
broader term "locating" or identifying" in place of the chosen term "contacting."
56. Id. at 901(6).
57. See Joel R. Reidenberg & Paul M. Schwartz, Data Protection Law and
Online Services: Regulatory Responses, at 23 & n. 89, available at
<http: / /europa.eu.int/comm/intemal-market/en/media/dataprot/studies/reg
ul.pdf>.
58. See id. at 23 & n.88.
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provider such as AOL; a dial-up address may be different for
each session. The extent to which such addresses actually vary,
however, is neither clear nor legally controlled in the United
States. Even if a dial-up service provider routinely changes a
user's IP address, the service provider can easily obtain the
correlations.59 Furthermore, most service providers track their
users' trips across the web.6°
According to a recent study by Joel Reidenberg and Paul
Schwartz, the member states of the EU, although ahead of the
United States in developing privacy law, have yet to reach a clear
policy on the status of IP addresses. 6' For example, although
Belgian law favors anonymity, determining whether IP addresses
are covered by Belgian data protection law is problematic 
Belgian authorities have stated that information is not fully
anonymous unless the content of the data is such that its
possessor cannot re-identify the person concerned without
special effort. French law is also wary of any information that
might be traced back to a specific person or to a relatively small
group of persons. Rulings relating to different media, however,
can be analogized to support opposite outcomes as to IP
63addresses. The issue still remains open in German law, but IP
addresses are likely to be protected if other available types of
information may be used to allow identification of an
59. See id. at 23.
60. See Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions (Senate, May
23, 2000) (remarks of Mr. Hollings introducing S 2606) (asserting that most
service providers track their customers, AOL being the main exception),
available at <http://www.thomas.gov> (query for Congressional Record pages
related to S 2606). AOL, however, does not deserve a presumption of full
consumer trust. The click-through contract one accepts when becoming an
AOL member is constructed not to be printable for future reference. See e-mail
from Alma, AOL Support Employee, to AOL member (Sept. 15, 2000) (on file with
Catholic University Law Review) ("I would like to apologize but the agreement is
an integral part of the AOL software installation and cannot be printed."). AOL
and Netscape, an AOL subsidiary, have been sued for including in
SmartDownload (an appliance that downloads computer software from the
Internet) a function that reports downloads back to Netscape/AOL. See
Amended Class Action Complaint, Specht et al. v. Netscape Comm. Corp., et al.,
No. 00 Civ.' 4871 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (on file with Catholic University Law
Review).
61. See Reidenberg & Schwartz, supra note 57, at 23-43.
62. See id. at 24-28.
63. See id. at 28-35.
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individual.6 4 In the United Kingdom, IP addresses are likely to
be considered protected personal information when a data
possessor has access to additional data allowing identification of
the subject, but not otherwise.65
American Internet advertising services, furthermore, place
advertisements as if the browser IP address was tied to a human
target with a known psyche. For example, 24/7 Media "target[s]
advertisements to specific computers and . . . measure[s] ad
effectiveness" by using "anonymous, non-personal, demographic
information" supplied by some "advertisers [and] Web
publishers" in combination with "other anonymous demographic
information" that is "contained in 24/7 Media's database."6 6 If
the Privacy Act does not protect IP addresses, it will not fully
protect specific human psyches from intrusion and shadowing.
In addition to its failure to handle IP addresses, the Privacy
Act is underinclusive in other ways. It would reach only web
sites and on-line services operated for commercial purposes,
excluding non-profit entities.6 7 The non-profit health site that
you visit may, therefore, pass information onto your insurance
company without violating the statute - despite the "rights"
proclaimed in the bill's findings. Even if backed by unusually
strong FTC-promulgated regulations, the Privacy Act would not
sufficiently combat anonymous on-line profiling. Private
individuals have no cause of action regarding non-PII; and opt-
out "choice" is allowed. Further, the Privacy Act would not
create an easily navigable, fully private Internet space. 8 Still,
64. See id. at 35-40.
65. See id. at 41-43.
66. 24/7 Media Privacy <http://www.247media.com/privacy.html> (visited
Sept. 8, 2000).
67. It also only reaches sites within Congress's power to regulate under the
Commerce Clause. See id. at 90 1(1).
68. The Act does, however, include government promotion of privacy
enhancing computer agents such as P3P. See infra note 106 and accompanying
text; see also S. 2606, 106th Cong. § 707 (2000) (indicating that the National
Institute of Standards and Technology shall "encourage and support the
development of [software for Internet access for expressing user's privacy
preferences that] automatically execute the program, once activated, without
requiring user intervention"). As of Labor Day 2000, several other bills relating
to on-line privacy were also sitting in congressional committees. None are as
sweeping as the Privacy Act. Considering these bills in chronological order of
their introduction, their major on-line thrusts are as follows:
The Online Privacy Protection Act of 1999 requires the FTC to promulgate
regulations concerning personally identifiable information collected on line from
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the bill would be an enormous advance in individual control of
persons above the age of 13 and to approve industry created programs as "safe
harbors." The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act does not protect persons
over thirteen. See 15 U.S.C. 6501. Only the FTC and state attorneys general
have standing to sue. The Bill does not expressly define IP addresses as PII, but
the FTC has some regulatory power over the definition of PII. S. 809, 106th
Cong. § 8(8) (1999).
The Electronic Rights for the 21st Century Act provides standards for
government access to stored electronic information and lessens government
control of strong encryption. S. 854, 106th Cong. § 102 (1999).
The Internet Consumer Information Protection Act requires that web surfers
be given notice of information collection, a chance to opt-out of the collection of
this data, and the ability to correct personally identifiable data. H.R. 2882,
106th Cong. §§ 1, 2, 5 (1999). The FTC may issue cease and desist orders, and
individuals may sue in a civil action for appropriate relief. PII is defined by
reference to 47 U.S.C. § 551, which merely excludes "any record of aggregate
data which does not identify particular persons." 47 U.S.C. §551(2)(A) (2001)
(referenced by H.R. 2882 5(3)).
The Online Privacy Protection Act of 2000 is substantively similar to the
Online Privacy Act of 1999, described above, including its definition of PII. H.R.
3560, 106th Cong. § 8(8) (2000).
The Privacy Policy Enforcement in Bankruptcy Act of 2000 removes from a
debtor's assets any personally identifiable information whose sale would violate
the debtor's privacy. The list of PII does not mention computer IP addresses,
but does include an expandable provision. S. 2857 Sec. 2(6)(H), 106th Cong. §
2(6)(H) (2000) ("[Alny other identifier that permits the physical or electronic
contacting of a specific individual."). I would prefer the much broader
"profiling," or even the slightly boarder "locating" or "identifying" to the chosen
"contacting."
The Consumer Internet Privacy Enhancement Act requires detailed, accurate
notices of on-line collection of personally identifiable information. The FTC is to
approve private seal programs as safe harbors. Only the FTC and state
attorneys general have standing to sue. The FTC is to commission a study on
privacy by the National Research Council. The definition of PHI does not include
IP addresses, but it does include "unique identifying information that an
Internet service provider or operator of a commercial web site collects and
combines with any information" earlier defined as PII. S. 2928 Sec. 6(5)(F),
106th Cong. § 6(5)(F) (2000).
Only one of these privacy bills was ordered reported out of committee by the
end of the 106th Congress, the Privacy Commission Act. H.R. 4049, 106th
Cong. (2000). This bill toothlessly creates the Commission for the
Comprehensive Study of Privacy Protection and orders the Commission to hold
hearings and make a report. Id. § 3 (2000). If this is the sum total of action
congressional committees are willing to send to the floor, one can only conclude
that tight top-down privacy regulation currently is unlikely in the United States.
My search, furthermore, probably missed relevant material. On September
2, 2000, a search on Thomas (Congress's online database) for pending bills that
included the word "privacy" produced 50 hits. See Thomas (visited Sept. 2,
2000) <http://thomas.loc.gov>. Thomas, however, is incapable of displaying
over 50 hits. To confirm this limit, I ran a search for all bills including the word
"act"; Thomas retrieved only 50 hits. Id. (visited Sept. 25, 2000). My thanks to
Jonathan Winer for mentioning this problem with Thomas.
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personal information for U.S. residents.
C. Bottom-Up Regulation
1. Theoretical Problems
Tight bottom up regulation, however, seems even less likely.
The problems include: (a) non-transparency; 6 (b) consumers'
time constraints; (c) consumers' limited technical expertise; (d)
business' reluctance to invoke sufficient penalties; and (e) Peter
Swire's mice-players who cannot be controlled effectively by
regulatory entities because they are small, mobile, and breed
rapidly. 70 Existing partial solutions, furthermore, disadvantage
small businesses 71 despite hoopla about the Internet-
empowering, less capitalized businesspersons.
69. See infra text accompanying notes 73-75.
70. See Peter Swire, Of Elephants, Mice, and Privacy: International Choice of
Law and the Internet, 32 INT'L LAw. 991 (1999), available at
<http: //www.acs.ohio-state.edu/units/law/swire 1/elephants.htm>.
71. A strong brand name is the biggest boost to Internet consumer
confidence. See CHESKIN RESEARCH, supra note 39, at 7. IFTC Commissioner
Orson Swindle, on the other hand, argues that government on-line privacy
regulations would force small businesses off the Internet and act as artificial
barriers to the entry of other small businesses into ecommerce. See FTC,
Privacy 5/00, at 24. My suggestion for opt-in government does not have these
alleged drawbacks of standard top-down regulation. The percentage of small
businesses that sold over the Internet dropped from 29% in 1998 to 26% in
1999; revenues from on-line sales dropped from 12% to 8% of total sales. See
Dun & Bradstreet, Small Businesses Skeptical of Internet Impact, NUA Internet
Surveys, available at
<http: //www.nua.net/surveys/?fvs&artid'005344816&rel'true>.
72. The 2000 Platform of the Republican Party was enthusiastic about small
business:
Small businesses are the underlying essence of our economy. Small
businesses create most of the new jobs and keep this country a land of
opportunity. They have been the primary engines of economic advance
by American women, whose dynamic entry into small business in
recent years has accounted for much of the nation's growth. Small
businesses generate more than half of the gross domestic product.
Their willingness to give people a chance, and their ability to train
individuals new to the work force, made welfare reform the success that
it is. They deserve far better treatment from government than they
have received. We will provide it through many of the initiatives
explained elsewhere in this platform: lower tax rates, ending the death
tax, cutting through red tape, legal and product liability reform, and the
aggressive expansion of overseas markets for their goods and services.
Republican National Committee, supra note 8, available at
<http://www.rnc.org/2000/2000 platform2>. The Democratic Platform also
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Market choice activation of the "invisible hand" requires
transparency. Consumers cannot choose x unless they can tell
when x is, and is not, part of the offer. In many ways,
transparency does not exist in the market for on-line privacy.
First, a user may not find out that his private information was
shared with a third party. Second, if the user does find out that
his private information was shared (perhaps he receives
unrequested catalogs or e-mail advertisements), he is unlikely to
know which information collector is responsible. Putting a
different false statement into each submission in order to
identify any information thief is an unrealistically large burden
took an enthusiastic approach:
Strengthening small business is a vital component of economic
innovation, job
creation, and supporting entrepreneurship. Small businesses have
accounted for more than 90 percent of the 22 million new jobs created
with Democratic leadership. The Democratic Party is committed to
sustaining and adding to that level of growth of small businesses,
including home based businesses. Democrats believe that
strengthening small businesses is a vital component of strategies to
create opportunity and community economic development. We will
build on the tremendous progress of the Clinton-Gore Administration in
modernizing the Small Business Administration and improving access
to the Federal marketplace. We will fight to reform and strengthen
programs to combat discrimination against women and minority
entrepreneurs, including federal procurement, because the playing field
is still not level.
Democratic National Committee, supra note 8, available at
<http://www.democrats.org/hq/ resources/platform/index.html>. Al Gore is
continuing the pro-small business rhetoric:
In the private sector, Democrats believe in supporting the startups, the
small businesses, and the entrepreneurs that are making the New
Economy go. This means making permanent the Research and
Experimentation tax credit and expanding it to make it partially
refundable so that small businesses can use it more easily. It also
means keeping cyberspace a duty-free zone so that American
companies can sell goods around the world and insist that other
countries refrain from actions that impede commerce. To expand
technology's worldwide potential as a force for good, Al Gore has
advanced a bold vision for a new Global Information Infrastructure-a
network of networks that sends messages and images at the speed of
light, across every continent-to expand access to phone service and
communications, further improve the delivery of education and health
care, and create new jobs and industries.
Id. Using niche-marketing techniques, some small businesses have obtained
some help from Internet connections. See Leslie Kaufman, The Opposite of
Amazon.com, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2000, available at
<http: / /www.nytimes.com/2000/09/22/technology/ 22smal.html.
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for a non-paranoid Internet user.7 3 Third, on-line information
collection can be accomplished without the consumer's
knowledge. "Cookie" technology can abstract information
invisibly as one merely browses a web page; one does not have
to enter information into data fields or click on banner
advertisements. Furthermore, an unannounced third party
administering advertising content on the web page, "banner
advertisements," may collect this information.74 Information
regarding a consumer's Internet activities can be consolidated
without the consumer's knowledge .
If consolidated and shared with interested third parties,
information that is innocuous in some contexts may have
serious repercussions. This raises questions such as: (1) would
you want perspective employers to know that you looked up
AIDS in ten free on-line medical databases?;7 6 (2) would you
73. See SUSANNAH Fox ET. AL., TRUST AND PRIVACY ONLINE: WHY AMERICANS
WANT TO REWRITE THE RULES 10 (Released by the Pew Internet & American Life
Project, Aug. 20, 2000), available at <http://www.pewInternet.org> (only 24% of
American Internet users reported having given incorrect personal information to
a web site). But see Profiling Workshop, supra note 17, at 22, 68 ("[Mlany
studies show that upwards of 70 % of the information that's disclosed is either
deliberately or accidentally misleading or inaccurate," remarks of Daniel Jaye,
Chief Technology Officer, Engage Technologies, Inc., Internet advertising
agency).
74. Online Profiling Part 1, supra note 17, at 2-4.
75. See id. at 2-8; see also Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options
at All: The Fight for Control of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REv. 1033,
1033-45 (1999) (providing some specifics on extent of information collection and
compilation); Privacy.net, The Consumer Information Organization From
Consumer.net <http://www.privacy.net> (visited Oct. 12, 2000) (providing
multiple negative stories). Once an information collection exists, controlling its
dissemination raises additional problems. For example, schools generally have
logs of web sites accessed from their computers' records, which might provide
information about the browsing behavior of specific children. Such logs have
been shared with businesses as a type of payment for supplying free Internet
hardware and software and with at least one public advocacy group that wished
to argue that school filtering software over-limited students' computer use. A
New Hampshire parent is currently suing for access to logs from schools
without filtering software in order to pressure for the software's installation.
See Carl S. Kaplan, Suit Considers Computer Files, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2000,
available at
<http: / /www.nytimes.com/2000/09/28/technology/29cyberlaw.html>.
76. "A recent study showed that more than a third of all Fortune 500
companies check medical records before they hire or promote." The White
House, Remarks by the President on Medical Privacy,
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/ wh/new/html/1999/1029.html> (visited Oct. 9,
2000). Another recent study showed major and pervasive problems with the
20011
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want your boss to know that you routinely cruise help-wanted
ads?; (3) would you, if a teacher, want the parents of your grade
school students to know your interest in nude vacation resorts?,
(4) even if you are "innocent," would you want the burden of
justifying your actions? 77; and (5) would you want to relinquish
the ability to act in different locally appropriate manners inside
different normative communities?
78
Even to people who enjoy receiving targeted advertising
enabled by "cookies, 79  some outcomes of consolidated
information may be unwelcome. For example, if you visit an on-
line store, would you want the vendor to know that you have an
above average interest in the vendor's specialty product and a
relatively deep pocket? If so, you may be asked to pay more for
that product at every store you visit.80  Retailers with more
information are more likely to use the negotiation price strategy
for high-ticket items.
content and accuracy of health insurance web sites' privacy policies. See
California HealthCare Foundation, Health Insurance (information collected Feb.
through May 2000),
<http: //www.ehealth.chef.org/ind-study 10/index-show.cfm?docid' 162>
(visited Oct. 13, 2000).
77. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 152 (1999)
(discussing a man who was recorded on a video camera leaving hotel room with
an attractive, much younger woman-his daughter).
78. See id. at 152 (arguing that monitoring and recording of behavior
collapses borders between normative communities). The Navy, for example,
ordered the separation of Senior Chief Petty Officer Timothy R. McVeigh after 17
years of exemplary service, because his AOL file mentioned homosexuality; the
Navy board heard no evidence of homosexual words or behavior in any other
venue. See McVeigh v. Cohen, 983 F. Supp. 215 (D.D.C. 1998) (enjoining
preliminarily the separation because the AOL disclosure was likely to be held a
violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act). The Navy later settled
with McVeigh; he retired early and received $90,000 to cover legal fees. See
Outed Retired Sailor Says He Is Gay, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Oct. 2, 1998.
79. See Pew Internet & American Life Project, Trust and Privacy Online: Why
Americans Want To Rewrite the Rules, available at
<http://www.pewlnternet.org> (reporting that 27% of Internet users consider
tracking-allowed advertisements helpful) [hereinafter Pew Project].
80. Yes, if you are looking for a common fungible item, you may find a store
outside the informed group. The need to do so, however, greatly raises search
costs. Further, the only available low-priced merchant may lack other desirable
attributes, such as a good return policy. Amazon.com recently backed off a test
of "dynamic pricing," charging different customers different non-negotiable
prices for the same goods; Amazon.com claimed that it had not based the price
differences on demographics -despite the rumors to the contrary. See
Infoworld.com,
<http: / /www.infoworld.com/articles/hn/xml/00/09/28/000928
hnamazondvd.xml> (visited Oct. 2, 2000).
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Even if you believe that your life is blameless and bland
enough to showcase in a Macy's store window without
embarrassment, is it desirable to allow profiling that enables
redlining? Or to enable more efficient manipulation of
consumers? Of voters? 81  Inconsistent pronouncements are
easier to hide if one can send different content to multiple
targeted groups. Information affects reality, even if that
information is wrong, misleading, or misunderstood.82
2. Current Status in the United States83
Web page privacy notices are a good beginning, as are the
emerging "seal" programs, such as TRUSTe and BBBOnLine,
which reassure consumers that the visited site follows certain
privacy guidelines.84  In the summer of 2000, the National
Advertising Initiative (NAI) announced a new policy providing
some protection against invisible advertisement-placement
81. Businesses already exist to sell demographically organized voter
information to candidates. See, e.g., Leslie Wayne, One Consulting Firm Finds
Voter Data Is A Hot Property, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2000, available at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/09/technology/O9priv.html>. Aristotle
International combines voting list information with commercially available
databases. The company's services include targeted Internet advertisements.
George W. Bush allegedly used the service. Although Al Gore's campaign
refused to do so on privacy grounds, Gore's running mate Joseph I. Lieberman
is allegedly an Al customer. See id. Political advertising in the United States is
increasingly like commercial advertising. See generally RONALD K. L. COLLINS &
DAVID M. SKOVER, THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE (1996) (discussing effects of
advertising and commercialization on politics and political discourse in the
United States since the advent of mass broadcast media).
82. Hirsch's Theory of Internet Reality claims (only partially tongue-in-
cheek) that R=IT2 (reality equals information times speed of information transfer
squared). Wide and rapid transfer of information creates the impression that
the information is accurate. See David Beckman & David Hirsch, We Log On,
Therefore We Believe, ABA J., Sept. 2000, at 74. Recall the political brouhaha
over the racist reading of RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL
CURVE (1994), which discussed the alleged differences in intelligence among
different population groups in the United States. INTELLIGENCE, GENES, &
SUCCESS: SCIENTISTS RESPOND TO THE BELL CURVE at v- vi (ed. Bernie Devlin, et.
al. 1997 paperback ed.) asserts that the 1994 publication of THE BELL CURVE
"quickly produced an engaged public response . . . colored by political
perspectives" and that "Imlany of the harshest criticisms appear to come from
those who scarcely refer to statements and claims actually found in the book!"
See ROBERT L. HAYMAN, JR., THE SMART CULTURE: SOCIETY, INTELLIGENCE, AND
LAw 8-10 (1998), which attacks both THE BELL CURVE'S science and others'
political use of THE BELL CURVE).
83. In this section, "current" means through September 2000.
84. See, e.g., FTC, Privacy 5/00, at 6-7 (discussing seal organizations).
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firms.
Under the NAI principles, consumers will be notified of
network advertisers' profiling activities on host web sites and
their ability to choose not to participate in profiling. Where PII is
collected for profiling "robust notice will be required at the time
and place such information is collected and before the personal
data are entered., 85 Where non-PII is collected for profiling, clear
and conspicuous notice will be in the host web site's privacy
policy. Under the NAI principles, NAI companies will
contractually require that host web sites provide such disclosure
and will make reasonable efforts to enforce these requirements.
At the time of the announcement, NAI's membership allegedly
controlled about ninety percent of the network advertising
industry (looking at revenue and number of advertisements).86
The FTC, especially its Commissioner Orson Swindle, greeted
the NAI guidelines with enthusiasm. The stock market
presumably saw the guidelines as pro-advertiser because shares
in the Internet advertising firm DoubleClick rose thirteen
percent in one day.8 8 Such self-regulation, however, leaves ten
percent of Internet advertising unlinked to privacy notices. In
85. See Online Profiling Part 2, supra note 17, at 4; see also NAI, Self-
Regulatory Principles for OnLine Preference Marketing by Network Advertisers,
available at <http://www.ftc.gov/ os/2000/07index.htm#27> (supplying the
final text of the NAI policy in a PDF document indexed under July 27, 2000)
[hereinafter NAI Final]. Experts disagree emphatically on the likelihood that
non-personally identifiable information can (or will) be correlated with
personally identifiable information. Compare Profiling Workshop, supra note 17,
at 22, 68 ('The standard is not that we won't violate privacy or we won't figure
out who the consumer is; our standard is that we can't. Literally, if you go
through our database, we can't figure out who you are.") (remarks of Daniel
Jaye, Chief Technology Officer, Engage Technologies, Inc., Internet advertising
agency), with id. at 43, 61 (remarks of Richard Smith, independent Internet
security consultant), and id. at 43-44, 78 (stating that cookies track persons
across domains and "do become universal Ids") (remarks of Eric Winger,
Assistant Attorney General in New York's Internet Bureau). DoubleClick,
another Internet advertising giant, however, recently purchased a large off-line
database; the company seemingly intended to merge this acquisition with its
on-line data. See Profiling Workshop, supra note 17, at 177-78.
86. See Online Profiling Part 2, supra note 17, at 6.
87. See id. ("IT]he NAI principles present a solid self-regulatory scheme.");
id. at 9 ("Simply stated, we do not have a market failure here that requires
legislative solution . . . I oppose imposing burdensome regulation on an entire
industry to address the 10% of advertisers who are not members of NAI ....")
(quoting Commissioner Swindle).
88. See Pew Project, supra note 79, at 5.
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addition, some firms may drop out of the program,89 new market
entrants may not join, and some website hosts may not
cooperate. 9° Most violations, except for the notice provisions of
the guidelines, will be difficult for consumers to detect.
Furthermore, privacy notices, even with opt-out or opt-in
provisions, are not enough. 91  Many existing polices are long,
complex, confusing, and self-contradictory.92  Even ignoring
problems surrounding the clarity and credibility of privacy
policies, the user must sacrifice a considerable amount of time
to read the policy at each website visited.93
Individually obtained technological privacy protection is not
sufficient. Disregarding the pros and cons of specific privacy-
enhancing technology,94 to expect users to acquire technology to
89. The game industry's self-regulation standards ban targeting children in
advertising of violent games, but the FTC recently reported wide spread
violations. See FTC Violence, supra note 5, at 53.
90. See Online Profiling Part 2, supra note 17, at 6 (calling for legislation
because of these shortfalls). Drop out had already begun when I first wrote this
article. For example, between the June FTC announcement and early
September, NAI lost both Avenue A and L90. NAI gained Adsmart and Real
Media. The membership list also started listing two subparts of other members:
B Flycast and NetGravity (respectively part of Engage and DoubleClick).
Compare FTC, Prepared Statement of the FTC, Online Profiling: Benefits and
Concerns before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
(June 13, 2000), at 5, available at <http://www.
ftc.gov/os2000/06/onlineproflle.htm>, with NAI, Our Members,
<http://www.networkadvertising.org/> (visited Oct. 11, 2000). As of April 18,
2001, NAI included AdForce, Avenue A, Double Click, Engage Inc., L90,
MatchLogic Inc., and 24/7 Media. See id. (last visited Apr. 18, 2001).
91. The difference between opt-in and opt-out is easy to overstate. "Opt-in"
screens can be presented with the opt-in box already checked. Opt-in, however,
has the potential to short-circuit business' attempts to externalize costs onto
consumers. See, e.g., Sovern, supra note 75, at 1106.
92. See FTC, Privacy II, supra note 17, at 24-26; see also EPIC, Surfer
Beware III: Privacy Policies without Privacy Protection ("We also found that the
privacy policies available at many websites are typically confusing, incomplete,
and inconsistent.") <http://www.epic.org/reports/surfer-beware3.html> (visited
Aug. 27, 2000).
93. Information collectors are using transaction costs to lower rates of
consumer opt-out. See Sovern, supranote 75, at 1081-94; see also LESSIG,
supra note 77, at 160 ("No one has the time or patience to read through
cumbersome documents describing obscure rules for controlling data.").
94. Compare, e.g., World Wide Web Consortium, Platform for Privacy
Preferences (P3P) Project <http:/www.w3.org/P3P> (visited Aug. 10, 2000) (P3P
is emerging as an industry standard providing a simple, automated way for
users to gain more control over the use of personal information on Web sites
they visit), with, e.g., Karen Coyle, P3P: Pretty Poor Privacy?: A Social Analysis of
the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) <http://www.kcoyle.net/pep.html>
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block privacy invasions puts the burden on consumers. Privacy
should not be a luxury reserved for the computer savvy or for
those who can afford such protection.9 5 The time burden, even
for the savvy, is heavy and never-ending, and even the
installation of the most up-to-date pro-privacy technology will
not defend against technology upgrades. Furthermore,
information seeking technology may be protected as a trade
secret inaccessible even to the computer savvy.
a. Focused Reality Check: NAI Principles, September 2000
Government is not the only slow mover. Industry has not
rushed into privacy protection. In 1995, the FTC began
publicizing the need for privacy protection on the Internet and
its desire for industry to take charge.96 In November 1999, the
FTC held a public workshop on on-line profiling, and the NAI
responded by submitting drafts of proposed self-regulation.9
The final text was not given to the FTC, however, until July 27,
2000.99 With one exception-the ban on merging PII with non-
PI-no one is required to follow the NAI principles for yet
another six months.'00 Entities can join the NAI after the
principles are in force and still get another six months to
(P3P "is designed not to protect data privacy but to facilitate the gathering of
data by web sites.") (visited Aug. 10, 2000). EPIC is a good starting point for
surfers interested in pro-privacy technologies. See EPIC, EPIC Online Guide to
Practical Privacy Tools <http://www.epic.org/privacy/tools.html> (providing
links to many privacy providers) (visited Oct. 2, 2000).
95. The vast majority of consumers are not even ready to handle secure e-
mail. See William Spernow, Commentary, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2000, available
at <http://www.ny times/com/cnet/CNET0_42613005_00.html>. Besides
fearing the loss of a new technological breach in your privacy wall, many
computer users may have a fear of inadvertently harming their own data. Even
technologically sophisticated computer users may inadvertently harm their
computer databases when attempting to install privacy-protection systems.
See, e.g., Profiling Workshop, supra note 17, at 44, 86-87 (remarks of Danny
Wetzner, Technology and Society Domain Leader for the World Wide Web
Consortium admitting that he wiped most of his computer while trying to install
a privacy system).
96. See Online Profiling Part I, supra note 17, at i-ii.
97. Profiling Workshop, supra note 17 (providing transcript).
98. See FTC, Online Profiling: Benefits and Concerns before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (June 13, 2000), at 5,
available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/06/onlineprofile.htm>.
99. See NAI Final, supra note 85.
100. Id. VI, at 12.
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comply, with this same exception.'0 ' Furthermore, the NAI
principles may be amended by a four-fifths vote of the
signatories. 10 2 A one-stop opt-out spot expected to have pro-NAI
publicity is supposed to be established; however, it presently
has no opt-out. 10 3 Perhaps some improvement will occur when
the six-month window elapses. 1
0 4
Certainly self-regulation is an improvement over no regulation,
but the NAI principles are incomplete. First, the NAI principles
do not affect targeted advertising using non-PII. A user can still
be followed around the Internet by advertisements chosen,
partially because of the sites he has previously visited, the
search terms he has used, his domain name, and unclarified
other data. Advertisers have no duty to notify the Internet user
of this practice or of the data collection on which it is based, or
to provide the user with the ability to opt-out of such advertising
or the supporting data collection. 15 The NAI principles also do
not stop statistical reporting based on non-PII. 10 6  The NAI
principles do require an opt-in notice for collection of P1, 10 7 but
PII seemingly does not include potentially revealing Internet
protocol addresses. These addresses may be used to obtain PII,
as the NAI principles obliquely admit.
This admission meshes with a gigantic loophole inside NAI's
"Dissemination Restrictions," which state that "[nletwork
advertisers shall contractually require that any third parties to
which they provided PHI data adhere to, at a minimum, OPA
Guidelines. "108 For third parties to whom advertisers provide
101. Id.
102. Id. VIII, at 12. This provision may be the reason why certain large
entities are members themselves, as well as containing member subsidiaries.
For example, Flycast and AdKnowledge are parts of Engage. See infra notes
118-20 and accompanying text. NetGravity is identified on the membership list
as part of DoubleClick. See NAI <http://www.networkadvertising.org> (visited
Oct. 11, 2000).
103. See NAI <http://www.networkadvertising.org> (visited Oct. 11, 2000).
NAI's members include 24/7, Burst!Media, DoubleClick, Engage, Flycast,
MatchLogic, NetGravity (a division of DoubleClick), and Real Media. See id.
104. As of April 2001, the NAI site has an opt-out spot, where a visitor may
check separate boxes to opt-out of non-PlI collection by Adforce, Avenue A,
Double Click, Engage, L90, MatchLogic, and 24/7 Media. Enforcement by
Arthur Andersen LLP is allegedly forthcoming. See id.
105. See NAI Final IV.B.2(a), (b), supra note 85.
106. See id.
107. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
108. The OPA (Online Privacy Alliance) guidelines are also the NAI rules on
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non-aggregate, non-PII data to be merged with PII data
possessed by the third party, the network advertisers must
require those transferees to adhere to the NAI self-regulatory
principles -"unless the non-personally identifiable data is the
proprietary data of the particular third-party publisher or
advertiser."'0 9
Any network advertiser is allowed to sell individuals' non-
personally identifiable dossiers to any client. If technology did
not allow this data to be merged with individuals' names,
addresses, and social security numbers, i.e., their PII, no
restrictions would be required. Restrictions, however, were
written. I conclude, therefore, that privacy advocates who
warned the FTC that non-PII was easily integrated with PII were
correct." ° To be able to merge PII and non-PII without even
theoretical restraint, furthermore, the client and network
advertiser merely need to declare that the PII is the client's
property, as opposed to the property of the network advertiser.
These are merely straw regulations to comfort straw men."'
NAI members are supposed to contract for their clients to
follow certain notice, choice, and non-merger provisions. NAI
members, however, have no obligation to stop selling
information to clients who violate such covenants, to sue clients
who violate these covenants, or to report the identity of
uncooperative clients to the public or the appropriate
collection of PII. See NAI Final Il1, supra note 85, at 3. The OPA is an industry
group, not a consumer organization, and it requires notice and choice in the
vast majority of circumstances as to undefined PII. The guidelines do not apply
to "proprietary" information. See OPA, Guidelines for Online Privacy Polices
available at <http://www.privacyalliance. org/resources/ppguidelines.shtml>
(last visited Sept. 9, 2000).
109. See NAI Final IV.A.4, supra note 85, at 3-4 (emphasis added).
110. See, e.g., Profiling Workshop, supra note 17, at 61 (remarks of Richard
Smith, independent Internet security consultant).
111. As author Thomas Stems Eliot stated:
We are the hollow men
We are the stuffed men
Leaning together
Headpiece filled with straw. Alasl
This is the way the world ends
This is the way the world ends
This is the way the world ends
Not with a bang but a whimper.
Eliot, supra note 1, at 542.
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governmental body. NAI members are merely required to "make
reasonable efforts to enforce the contract.""12 Again, these are
straw regulations to comfort straw men.
b. Focused Reality Check: The Direct Marketing Association,
September 2000
The privacy policy posted on the Direct Marketing Association
"DMA" web site in September of 2000 offers an interesting reality
check. 13 DMA is one of the proud parents of the NAI." 4 Near
the beginning of its privacy policy, I was reassured by the
statement that "[flor each visitor, our Web server does not
recognize information regarding the e-mail address and we do
not place cookies on visitors' hard drive[sl." ' 5  But several
paragraphs later into the policy, I discovered that "we" does not
cover all entities involved in the site: "The DMA works with a
third party that serves ads to this site. To find out more about
how Flycast manages the privacy information in conjunction
with serving ads on this site, please go to
http: //www.flycast.com/aboutus/ about-privacy.shtml."" 6 The
DMA's notice does not indicate the information being collected
by Flycast; nor does it state that you can opt-out of Flycast's
information collection by visiting the supplied URL. 117  Both of
these wording choices lessen browsers' incentives to follow the
supplied hyperlink. 8  If you do attempt to reach
112. See NAI Final IV.B. 1.(d), (e), (g), supra note 85, at 5, 8, 11.
113. See DMA Interactive <http://www.the-dma.org> (visited Aug. 22, 2000).
"[DMAI is the oldest and largest trade association for users and suppliers in the
direct, database and interactive marketing fields." Id. EPIC's 1998 privacy
report asserted that DMA's members were not following the then-current DMA
privacy policy. See EPIC, EPIC Online Guide to Practical Privacy Tools
<http://www.epic.org/privacy/tools.html> (visited Oct. 2, 2000).
114. See Online Profiling Part 2, supra note 17.
115. DMA, Privacy Policy <http://www.the-dma.org/privacy.shtml> (visited
Aug. 22-23, 2000). Since September, 2000, DMA has changed its privacy policy
to state that DMA "place[s] cookies on visitors [sic] hard drives to collect
aggregate generic information about the number of visitors." ' Id. (last visited
May 17, 2001).
116. DMA, Privacy Policy <http://www.the-dma.org/privacy.shtml> (visited
Aug. 22-23, 2000) at 2.
117. "URL" stands for "universal resource locator," the address on the
Internet, which is the letter string keyed into a web browser's control line to
reach a desired site. See MARK A. LEMELY, ET. AL., SOFTWARE AND INTERNET LAW
1099 (2000).
118. "Linking" or "hyperlinking" by using "links" or "hyperlinks" refers to
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http://www.flycast.com, the URL listed on your browser
automatically morphs into http://www.engage.com. '1 9 At this
point, many jumpers may assume that the hyperlink is incorrect
and may stop trying to locate an opt-out point.,20
Engage.corn, also a proud member of the NAI,12 ' does place
cookies on visitors' browsers (presumably including when you
visit the DMA site). A visitor can opt-out of allowing Engage.com
to track him across the Internet by accepting an "opt-out
cookie." The privacy material at the Engage.corn site, however,
does not mention the DMA site. 22 Rather, the privacy-seeking
surfer has to understand the Internet sufficiently to recognize
the relationship between banner advertisements on other sites
and Engage.com's privacy discussion. Otherwise, the surfer
may inadvertently ask to be excepted only from being tracked
clicking a computer mouse on icons or underlined text (commonly colored blue
or red on computer screens) that take the user directly to another page or
document on the Internet. See id. At 1093-94. This process works through the
scientific magic of "HTML" (hypertext markup language), which is the lingua
franca of web pages. See id.
119. The DMA's use of an outdated URL appears misleading. The business
and advertising community has raised a tremendous fuss about the allocation
of domain names on the theory that the public expects a domain name to
match a firm's trade name. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 1125(d) (creating a cause of
action for "cyberpiracy" of domain name similar to a trademark); ICANN,
Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, available at
<http://www.wcann.org/udrp/udrp.htm> (providing a means to resolve
disputes between trademark holds and unaffiliated holders of allegedly
confusing domain names). Does the DMA have some reason for wanting
visitors to think its advertisements are not part of the Engage empire? Again,
no one is quite telling a lie. Flycast Communications is one of several smaller
firms that were integrated into Engage. See Engage.com, About Engage Media
<http://www.engage.com/engagemedia/aboutus> (visited Aug. 23, 2000).
Engage.com is now part of NASDAQ-traded CMGI, Inc., "the largest, most
diverse network of Internet companies in the world." See Engage.com
<www.engage.com/company /parentino-company.cfm> (visited Aug. 23 2000).
My suspicions, perhaps unjustified, were further aroused when I visited the
privacy page of GeoCities, which is now part of Yahoo! An early FTC privacy
invasion case targeted GeoCities. See Federal Trade Commission
<http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/9808/geocitie.htm> (visited Aug. 23, 2000)
(announcing FTC's first on-line privacy consent decree); see also Federal Trade
Commission <http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9808;index.htm> (providing links to
multiple FTC documents in File No. 982 3051, In re GeoCities).
120. A reference to Flycast can be found by running a site search at
Engage.com, but my attempts also retrieved many items in which I could find
no mention of Flycast.
121. See OnLine Profiling Part 1, supra note 17, at 22.
122. See Engage.com <http: / /www.engage.com>.
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while at Engage.com's home site.' 23 Opting out of being tracked
on the DMA site, therefore, is more than a de minimus burden
for the unsophisticated or time-conscious Internet surfer.
Neither the DMA nor Engage site contains factual
misstatements; many unsophisticated, rushed, or trusting
customers visiting the DMA site, however, may stop reading its
privacy policy as soon as they reach "[wle do not place cookies
on visitors hard drives.' 24 I do not consider this "clear notice."
Nor do I care that Engage uses double-blind patent pending
technology125 to keep the 800-item profile (used to justify
charging advertisers the most for banner advertisements) 2 6 to
segregate any personally identifiable information from the ad-
choosing profile it is building. 127
First, "anonymous" does not mean "harmless." The NAI self-
regulation rules were issued in response to FTC pressure about
on-line profiling (including anonymous profiling). The FTC
exerted this pressure because many Americans were very upset
by the practice of profiling customers, even "anonymous
profiling.' ' 128  Sixty-three percent of consumers are
uncomfortable with anonymous web tracking. Ninety-one
percent are uncomfortable with web sites sharing information in
order to track people across multiple sites. 129
Second, a consumer cannot be sure that a company will never
attempt to integrate the consumer's "anonymous" ad-choosing
123. The "Privacy On This Site" link advises the user to send an e-mail to
deal with information collected at the Engage site. A user must link to "Opt Out
Options" to block Engage's advertising service cookies. See Engage.com,
Privacy <http://www.engage.com/ privacy> (visited Aug. 22, 2000).
124. DMA, Privacy Policy <http://www.the-dma.org/privacy.shtml> (visited
Aug. 22-23, 2000).
125. See Engage.com, Privacy <http://www.engage.com/ privacy> (visited
Aug. 22, 2000)
126. See Welcome to Engage Media <http://www.engage.com/engagemedia>
(visited Aug. 22, 2000).
127. See Profiling Workshop, supra note 17, at 67-68 (remarks of Daniel Jaye,
Chief Technology Officer, Engage Technologies, Inc. & Jason Catlett, President
of JunkBusters).
128. See Online Profiling 1, supra note 17, at 12-13 (explaining why many
persons are against anonymous profiling). A 1997 Georgia Tech study reported
that 87% of American Internet users believed they should have complete control
over their demographic information. See Profiling Workshop, supra note 17, at
210, 276 (remarks of Andrew Shen, Policy Analyst, Electronic Privacy
Information Center).
129. See Online Profiling 1, supra note 17, at 15.
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800-item profile with P1.1 30 At the FTC's Workshop on Online
Profiling, DoubleClick claimed that technological barriers
prevented joining its anonymous profiles to PII without
consumer approval.' 3' DoubleClick, however, now admits that
one of its advertising customers does join the allegedly
unjoinable. 32  The FTC's report to Congress takes joinder
seriously:
The [20001 Survey data also demonstrate that 68% of
[Web] sites in the Random Sample, and 77% in the Most
Popular Group, collect non-identifiable information. The
weighted analysis figure is 76%. Most of the sites
surveyed, therefore, are capable of creating personal
profiles of online consumers by tying any demographic,
interest, purchasing behavior or surfing behavior
information they collect to personally identifiable
information. 133
Additionally, permanent enforceability of privacy policies
cannot be assumed. Ecommerce companies do change hands
and go bankrupt. Bankruptcy abrogates contracts. The
Internet retailer Toysmart.com (Toysmart), for example,
represented in its posted privacy policy that it would never share
130. Profiling Workshop, supra note 17, at 43, 61 (stating that identifying
someone who was the subject of "anonymous profiling" is "very, very easy").
"[AIIl you do is send out an e-mail message that sends back both the e-mail
address and the cookie." Id. (remarks of Richard Smith, Internet security
consultant).
131. See Profiling Workshop, supra note 17, at 124 (quoting Jonathan
Shapiro of DoubleClick).
[W]e are only ever going to capture that personally identifiable
information in places where the user is given notice, and as part of that
notice they will be given the choice to participate or not. If they choose
not to participate, if they opt out of the DoubleClick cookie, then there's
no way for me to link that personally identifiable information with their
online behavior. I can't technically do it.
Id. at 178.
132. In September 2000, DoubleClick's privacy notice informed surfers that
one unnamed DoubleClick client was combining DoubleClick-provided
anonymous data with personally identifiable information obtained elsewhere.
DoubleClick allegedly had requested the client to disclose this information on
its own web site. DoubleClick did not name the offending client. See
DoubleClick, Privacy Policy
<http://www.doubleclick.com/us/corporate/privacy/> (visited Sept. 2000).
133. FTC, Privacy II, supra note 17, at 9-10. "A weighted analysis figure
reflects the likelihood that a consumer will visit a site that follows that
practice." Id. at 8.
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consumers' personal information with any third party. 134 When
Toysmart entered into bankruptcy proceedings, however, it
attempted to sell its customer information database. The FTC
sued. FTC and Toysmart reached a settlement that did not
enforce the privacy policy. 135 The settlement did, however, limit
possible buyers of the database to businesses that "concentrate
[their] business in the family commerce market, involving the
areas of education, toys, learning" and that "expressly agree to
be Toysmart's successor- in-interest" regarding the database.
36
Bankruptcy Judge Carol Kenner dismissed the agreement
between the FTC and Toysmart as premature, "without prejudice
to the parties raising these issues" later. 137 According to some
sources, the judge commented, more disturbingly, that she
"concur[s] with the creditors' committee opinion that to restrict
the sale to a particular type of buyer is counterproductive to the
interests of the estate. Toysmart's database included
information on some 190,000 human (as opposed to merely
juridical) persons. 3 9  These persons might have been over-
trusting because Toysmart displayed a TRUSTe seal.' 40 A ray of
hope, though, Congress may pass legislation preventing transfer
of PII at bankruptcy if the transfer violates the debtor's privacy
policy. "4
134. Toysmart Privacy Policy, Ex. 1 to FTC's First Amended Complaint, FTC
v. Toysmart.com (D. Mass., Civ. No. 00- 1134 1-RGS),
<http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/07/toysmart2.htm> (visited Aug. 18, 2000).
The attorneys general of forty-four states also filed objections to the data sale.
See Bytes in Brief, Sept. 2000, at 3 (Bytes in Brief is a monthly, free cyber law
update service available from Sensei Enterprises, Inc., e-mail "senseient.com;
<http://www.senseisent.com>).
135. Several FTC Commissioners dissented or entered statements mentioning
concerns on this point. See Statement of Commissioner Anthony; Statement of
Commissioner Thompson; Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Swindle,
<http://www.ftc.gov/opa/ 2000/07/toysmart2.htm> (visited Aug. 18, 2000).
136. Exhibit A: Stipulation and Order Establishing Conditions on Sale of
Customer Information, Filed in United States Bankruptcy Court for the District
of Massachusetts, Eastern Division 2 (Chapter 11 Case No. 00-13995-CJK),
<http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/07/ toysmart2.htm> (visited Aug. 18, 2000).
137., Michael Brick, Judge Overturns Deal on Sale of Online Customer
Database, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2000, available at <http://www.nytimes.com>.
138. JunkBusters, What's News at JunkBusters
<http: //junnkbusters.com/ht/en/new. html> (visited Aug. 18, 2000).
139. See id.
140. See Brick, supra note 137.
141. Two bills were pending at the close of the 106 th Congress. See
Consumer Privacy Protection Act, S. 2606, 106th Cong. (2000); Privacy Policy
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c. Focused Reality Check: Banner Advertisements on Yahoo!,
September 2000
Since the vast majority of websurfers user commercial search
engines, I experimented further by visiting Yahoo!142  My
conclusion is that the time and frustration costs of opting out
are unacceptable burdens on web surfers. Yahoo! collects PII, in
addition to information it obtains from its business partners;
however, Yahoo! allegedly uses or shares this information only to
provide ordered services, unless the information source
consents.143  Yahool does not divulge whether it collects
individual or aggregated non-personally identifiable information,
nor does it state how it classifies browser IP addresses.
I began my web journey by linking from Yahoo!'s web page to
its privacy home page. (The link is at the very bottom of a long,
crowded page). From there, the viewer can link to any of eleven
other sites. I linked directly to "third party ad servers." Yahoo!
opens the discussion by assuring viewers that "Yahoo! sends to
[their] web browsers most of the advertisements [they] see when
[they] use the Yahoo network of web sites.' ' 144 A surfer who is
not easily reassured may continue down the page and discover
that "to prevent a third-party ad server from sending and
reading cookies on [her] computer, currently [the viewer] must
visit each ad network's web site and individually opt out (if they
Enforcement in Bankruptcy Act of 200, S.2857, 106th Cong. (2000). TRUSTe
filed an objection to the proposed FTC/Toysmart.com settlement with the
Bankruptcy court and hails the court's ruling as a victory, despite the still
unclear fate of the consumer information. See TRUSTe, TRUSTe Files Objection
to Federal Trade Commission Consent Agreement with Toysmart.com
<http://www.truste.org/ users/usersAtoysmart-objection.html> (visited Oct. 8,
2000); TRUSTe, TRUSTe Applauds Bankruptcy Court Decision Regarding
Toysmart.com, <http: //www.truste.org/users/users-toysmart-adv.html>
(visited Sept. 8, 2000).
142. Yahoo has "the largest global audience on the Web." Cory Johnson,
Yahoo "Ads" It Up, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, Sept. 11, 2000, at 79: see also
Steve Lawrence & C. Lee Giles, Accessibility of Information on the Web, 400
NATURE 107, 177 (July 1999) (indicating that Yahoo! is the site with the highest
advertising revenue).
143. See Yahoo! Privacy Center, <http://privacy.yahoo.com/privacy/us/
print.htm> (visited Sept. 31, 2000). Yahoo! also may use or share the




3, 2000) (emphasis added).
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offer this capability) .' 45
Yahoo!, therefore, both discourages its viewers from pursuing
privacy and raises the time cost of obtaining privacy. In
September 2000, Yahoo! listed nineteen different third party
advertisers. To illustrate the barriers to privacy, the following
pages report on some of these nineteen advertisers as viewed
from Yahoo!'s links.
1. 24/7 Media:1 46 The link from Yahoo! lands on a twenty-
three-page privacy statement with sufficient notice. 47  At the
beginning of the statement, the user is proffered direct links to
many different sections of the privacy document, including "Opt-
Out Policy," where the user may opt out of data collection.1 48 If
you read the entire statement, however, you locate additional
links to "interrelated business lines";149 some of these links offer
"more information" and some offer separate privacy policies. 50
24/7 gathers a large amount of data; the collected "anonymous
data" includes computer IP addresses and is sufficient to allow
"psycho-graphically" targeted advertising.' 5' Aggregated
anonymous data is shared with advertiser clients. 52 PII is used,
among other purposes, to "[glain a better general understanding
of the type of individuals viewing ads and visiting Web sites
serviced by 24/7 Media." 53 In the future, 24/7 does expect to
link PII and "Anonymous Data" for surfers who want super-
145. Id. (emphasis added).
146. 24/7 Media <http://www.247media.com> (visited Sept. 12, 2000).
147. See 24/7 Media, Privacy <http://www.247media.com/privacy.html>
(visited Sept. 12, 2000).
148. When I first visited the site on Sept. 3, 2000, I had a different
experience. The link was to a privacy statement headed by a notice that about
August 31, 2000 the site would post a new policy with "more robust notice and
choice regarding 24/7 Media's privacy and data collection practices." The policy
I saw rambled on for five pages starting with 24/7's membership in TRUSTe. I
was told how to opt out of information collection at 24/7.com and other sites
owned by 24/7, but I saw no mention of opting out of the finm's data collection
through advertisements it services on others' web sites. I was told (three pages
into the policy) that I could e-mail a given address to remove my name from
24/7's database of personally identifiable information. Why should I bother,
however, if the information would just reappear next time I browsed?
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targeted advertisements. 15 4
2. AdForce:'5 5 The link from Yahoo ends at a relatively concise
and understandable privacy statement, opening with an
explanation of how advertising enables low-cost content and
how data collection enables helpful advertising. 5 6  AdForce
reassures the user that it does not collect PII, and lists what
non-PII it does collect.'57 This includes one item that may be
personally identifiable (and is often at least group-identifiable):
the "IP address of the machine (browser/proxy) connecting to
AdForce."'5 8 At the bottom of the page, AdForce presents an
option to opt out of data collection.' 59 AdForce assures that all
opt-out cookies are indistinguishable and even offers a link to
instructions explaining how to disengage all cookies on your
browser. 
60
3. AdMonitor.net: You can't get there from here. Despite
repeated efforts, I could not reach AdMonitor.net from Yahoo!'s
supplied link, from the go-to function on my browser, or from
any of the hits obtained from Yahoo! searches for "AdMonitor"
and "AdMonitor.net."
4. AppNet/admaximize/i33: You land on a privacy statement
but not a helpful one. The first paragraph (shades of Engage)
tells you that the page covers information collected at the
"corporate Website." The offered links are "services," "clients,"
"invest," and "careers" -no hint on how to opt-out of
information collected on other sites to whom AppNet serves
advertisements. AppNet does supply an e-mail address for
persons with questions or comments about the privacy policy. I
sent an e-mail regarding their policy on September 4, 2000; I
have still received no response.
5. BeFree:16 Yes, you land on a privacy policy, but not one
that encourages a belief in self-regulation. 62 The policy opens
154. Id.
155. See AdForce <http://www.adforce.com> (visited Sept. 12, 2000).
156. See AdForce, AdForce and Privacy <http://www.adforce.com/company/





161. Be Free <http://www.befree.com> (visited Mar. 2, 2001).
162. See Be Free, Privacy Information
<http://www.befree.com/docs/includes/privacy.html> (visited Sept., 2000).
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with a TRUSTe logo and a long paragraph about BeFree
following TRUSTe's guidelines, followed by a clich6 paragraph
about "responsible online marketing.'' 63 When you get to the
"privacy section," bold print highlights that "BeFree does not
track the identify or contact information of end users."
However, it "does record IP addresses and it uses cookies to
• ,,164
observe the online behavior of anonymous visitors. To stop
tracking, users "always have the option to refuse cookies." 65
But the company fails to provide information on how to do this
or give an option to opt-out of just BeFree's cookie.
Furthermore, "[als BeFree manages affiliate programs for its
merchant clients, it is possible that BeFree has access on its
servers to personally identifiable information on end users. This
information belongs to merchants, and BeFree does not share
such information with third parties." 166 BeFree never states
whether (with BeFree's help) these merchant clients and their
affiliates tie PII to the "anonymous" tracking data. Furthermore,
BeFree has no control over the information practices of its
merchant clients and their affiliates. In other words, BeFree is
collecting information about users and letting unnamed,
unnumbered "clients and their associates" do whatever they
want to do with the information.
6 7
6. ClickHere: You do not land on a privacy policy. You reach
a home page that first blasts you with audiovisual content and,
only then, offers you a few links. None of the links take you to
any mention of a privacy policy or to a privacy link. I did not
bother sending an e-mail.
7. MatchLogic:168 The link from Yahoo! lands on MatchLogic's
home page, which has a privacy link. The privacy policy
discusses three types of data collection tied to three different
services that MatchLogic runs. 169  The company sponsorscontests to collect P11 and may exchange such information with
163. Id.




168. Matchlogic.com <http://www.matchlogic.com> (visited Sept. 8, 2000).
169. See Matchlogic.com, Privacy Policy <http://www.matchlogic.com/
privacy/privacy-policy.asp>. The three services are registration data collection,
on-line ad servicing, and e-mail marketing. See d. A "cookie opt-out" and a
"cookie opt-in" are also available. Id.
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"selected partners."'' 70  "Selected partners" store their data
collections with MatchLogic. In other words, look out; someone
may be collecting a large dossier on you. While MatchLogic
promises to stop using your PIH on request, it does not mention
if its "selected partners" will stop. MatchLogic also runs targeted
banner advertisements using cookies to collect non-PI. The
customer may opt-out of MatchLogic's cookie, but a visitor must
opt-out anytime he changes browsers or resets his cookie file.1
7'
MatchLogic does assure visitors that it keeps its anonymous and
PII databases separate.
8. Mediaple. 7 2 From Yahool you reach a three-page privacy
policy written in very small print. The company uses cookies
but allows opt-out. 173 Mediaplex does not collect quite the same
data as other banner-advertisement companies because it uses
the data its customers collect when targeting advertisements;
therefore, the viewer is advised to check the privacy policies of
the web sites he visits. 174 Mediaplex does not "maintain, share
or sell any personally identifiable data or anonymous user
profile information."'
' 5
9. Sabela:17 6 From Yahoo! you land on a two-page privacy
policy with readable print. Sabela uses cookies to create an
individual, anonymous profile, which it uses to serve targeted
advertisements to the visitor as he visits Sabela's customers'
Internet sites. 7 7 Sabela promises that it never shares private
individual profiles with others-including its clients; rather,
Sabela shares only aggregated information. 17  The anonymity,
however, seems potentially breachable because Sabela changes
a user's anonymous profile when it interacts with a client's site
170. Id. The policy indicates that such information will be shared with third
parties only if the on-line registrant agreed. See id. The policy also states that
it will stop using the P1 if a user so request. See id.
171. See id.
172. See http://www.mediaplex.com/mp/privacy/privacy.html.
173. See Mediaples.com, Privacy Policy, <http://www.mediaplex.com/mp/
privacy/privacy.html> (visited Sept. 8, 2000).
174. See id.
175. Id.
176. Sabela.com <http://www.us.sabela.com> (visited Sept. 8, 2000).
177. See id. Setting a cookie on a user's hard drive "allows [Sabela] to deliver





on which that user has changed his information.'7 9
10. VitaBella:'8 ° Yahoo! links directly to a privacy policy.'"'
VitaBella uses cookies with "unique id number[s]" to serve
targeted advertisements; however, the company does not build
or maintain profiles, nor does it aggregate data from multiple
clients. 1 2  VitaBella may collect voluntarily provided PII on
behalf of clients running promotions, but any PII collected is
supposedly kept separate from the anonymous information.'
8 3
11. WebConnect:184 While you do not land on a privacy policy,
you are offered a direct link to a "privacy pledge." 85 The pledge
is totally silent on what WebConnect does when it services
banner advertisements. The pledge is totally silent on whether
WebConnect collects information or how it handles any
information it collects. WebConnect merely "promises that it
encourages" its "Consumer Catalog clients to comply with the
DMA Promise Privacy Policy.' 8 6 If you follow the "What We Do"
link, you discover that WebConnect does collect information:
"[W]e target, place and track advertising . . . [with a] .
proprietary ICS tracking system .. . [in order to] .. .collect[]
vital statistics throughout the entire sales process."'
87
WebConnect claims that its tracking tool, "BrandROI," is the
first of its kind. BrandROl allegedly "can capture actual return
on investment from Internet advertisements seen, but not
clicked on. Advertisers can now track the amount of sales or
inquiries that result from the brand effect created via a specific
Internet advertisement.' 8 The company also uses CustomView,
an Internet advertisement replacement system, which "allows
[the advertising client] to adapt [its] campaigns for individual
Internet users and apply a viewer 'frequency cap' to [its] different
179. See id.
180. Vltabella <http://www.track-star.com/prvacy.html> (visited Sept. 8,
2000).
181. See Vitabella, Privacy <http://www.track-star.com/privacy.html.
182. Id.
183. See id.
184. WebConnect <http:www/webconnect.com> (visited Sept. 8, 2000).
185. See Webconnect, Privacy Pledge <http://www.webconnect.com/
NewMedia/Privacy.html> (visited Sept. 8, 2000).
186. Id.
187. WebConnect, What We Do <http://www.webconnect.com/site4/
WhatWeDo.asp> (visited Sept. 8, 2000).
188. Id.
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Internet advertisements. '8 9
Has this subsection been tedious? Consider the plight of a
surfer who works through all Yahoo!'s third-party advertisers.
In sum, if you want to control your private information, stay
off Yahool If you want to prevent profiling, stay off Yahoo!
Yahool, by the way, has a TRUSTe seal covering all of its English
language sites. After this trip through Yahoo!'s looking glass, I
am not surprised that a majority of U.S. consumers do not trust
ecommerce firms sufficiently to want relationships with them.1 90
d. Focused Reality Check: Seal Organizations, Sepember.
2000
Some hail the entrance of private seal organizations such as
TRUSTe and BBBOnLine Some action is better than no action.
Seal-backed privacy polices, however, are inadequate for several
reasons: (1) too few entities post them; (2) the seal organizations
do not have sufficient reputational clout; (3) the remedies for
violations are inadequate; and (4) the seal requirements are too
low to satisfy a large portion of the public.
Privacy policies are too rare on the Internet. Yes, they have
become more common since the FTC began publicizing online
privacy in 1995.9' The FTC's 2000 survey, however, found that
only 20% of randomly sampled sites and 42% in the "most
popular group" which collect PII partially implement the four
core principles: notice, choice, access, and security. Notice
means advising consumers what the company is doing; choice
means asking consumers to opt-in or opt-out of information
collection; access means allowing consumers to look at the
information the company has collected on them and to correct
inaccuracies; security means protecting the information
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., Donna L. Hoffman, et al., Building Consumer Trust in OnLine
Environments: The Case for Information Privacy, VAND. U. ELAB (1998), available
at <http://www2000.ogsm.vanderbilt.edu/papers.html> (consumers do not
trust merchants and will not do so until they have opt-in power over
information collection).
191. See FTC, Privacy II, supra note 17, at i-ii. The FTC's 1998 survey found
that about 92% of Web sites collected personal information but that only 14%
disclosed anything about their information practices. The 1999 Georgetown
Internet Privacy Policy Survey found that 10% of sites posted some disclosure
that at least touched on the four basic information practice principles (notice,
choice, access, and security). See id. at i.
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collected from unauthorized third parties. 192 A consumer is only
32% likely to land on a site that partially follows these four
principles.' Only 41% of randomly sampled sites and 60% in
the "most popular group" met even the FTC's very basic notice
and choice hurdles. A consumer has only a 58% percent chance
of encountering such a site. 1
9 4
These figures are overly cheerful. The FTC counted a site as
providing notice if it posted a privacy policy with any
information about the data it collects, how it uses that data
internally, and whether it shares the data with third parties.
195
Although 78% of sites in the "most popular group" allow third
parties to place cookies on their sites, only 51% of these sites
disclose that fact.196 The FTC did not quantify the absence of the
fifth core principle-enforcement of posted policies and redress
for harmed individuals.
197
As for sites with privacy policies backed by private seal
organizations, the FTC's 2000 survey reported that only about
8% of randomly sampled sites and 45% of the "most popular
group" display privacy seals.' 9 Looking only at the biggest
players, BBBOnLine, "a subsidiary of the Council of Better
Business Bureaus," claims more than 3500 seal holders.' 99 In
January of 2000, TRUSTe announced its 1000th seal.2 9°
TRUSTe's growth has been phenomenal; by late August, 2000,
192. See Online Profiling Part I, supra note 17, at 7-10.
193. See FTC, Privacy II, supra note 17, at 12.
194. See id. at 13. For more details, see id. at 7-28, Appendix A-C.
195. See id. at 15. The FTC gave credit for any principle if the site followed
that principle as to at least some information. See id. at 23.
196. See id. at 21. The weighted analysis figures are that 69% of sites a
surfer will visit have third party cookies and that only 41% of the cookied-sites
the surfer visits will disclose their existence. See id.
197. See Online Profiling Part 1, supra note 17, at 10.
198. See FTC, Privacy II, supra note 17, at ii.
199. BBBOnLine, How the Privacy Program Works
<http://www.bbbonline.org/privacy/index.asp> (visited Sept. 27, 2000). On
Sept. 7, 2000, however, the home page of the BBBOnLine web site said the
privacy program had 497 "participating web sites." Id. (visited 9/7/00). I sent
an email asking for clarification on September 7, 2000, but received no
response.
200. TRUSTe Awards 0001h Privacy Seall <http://www.truste.org/> (visited
Aug. 27, 2000). Privacybot does not give membership figures at its web site.
See Privacybot, <http://www.privacybot.com> (visited Aug. 27, 2000). On
August 27, 2000, I emailed Privacybot for more information; I received no
response'.
20011
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TRUSTe had almost 2000 seals. 20 ' These numbers, however, are
dwarfed by the size of the Internet. An empirical study of the
publicly indexable web, performed in February 1999, reported
2.8 million active, publicly accessible server addresses. °2
Internet growth already may have dwarfed that figure.
The concept of a privacy policy backed by a seal is that
consumers will trust the seal organization, °3 even if they do not
know the host company.204 There is little indication, however,
that consumers feel this way. The small number of seals issued
implies the opposite, so does the small number of privacy
disputes brought to the seal organizations.
2°5
201. E-mail from Dave Steer, TRUSTe, to author (Aug. 27, 2000) (on file with
Catholic University Law Review).
202. See Lawrence & Giles, supra note 142, at 107. If the same material was
accessible at multiple servers, the study only counted one address. See id. As
for amount of content, a recent report claims 1.2 billion documents theoretically
reachable with technology now used in most commercial web browsers and
another 550 billion documents which would be available with improved
technology. See Elinor Abreu, Diving into the Deep Web, THE INDUSTRY
STANDARD, Sept. 11, 2000, at 119. Search engine Google, supposedly, has only
indexed some 600 million pages so far. See id.
203. Seal organizations may not be trustworthy. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Our
Data Ourselves: Privacy, Propertization, and Gender, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 633
(2000) (questioning whether TRUSTe or BBBOnLine has shown willingness to
stand up for privacy against their customers, the web sites desiring seals); Bob
Tedeschi, Sellers Hire Auditors to Verify Privacy Polices and Increase Trust, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2000 (e-commerce report), available at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/18/technology/18ECOMMERCE.html>
(reporting that TRUSTe lost reputational clout when it failed to penalize
Microsoft, a TRUSTe investor and member, for collecting hardware identification
numbers from PC users without notifying or consulting the users). The EU is
concerned about consumer confusion among seal organizations and has,
therefore, begun work on member states accrediting seal issuing groups that
require a set of core principles. See Commissioner Byrne, Cyberspace and
Consumer Confidence speech to the Annual Conference of the Kangaroo Group
of MEP's)
<http: / /europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/health_consumer/library/speeches/speech5
5_en. html> (visited Sept. 9, 2000).
204. One 2000 survey reported that 92% of on-line households do not trust
companies to protect private information despite contrary promises. See
Tedeschi, supra note 203, available at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/18/technology/ 18ECOMMERCE.html>.
205. BBBOnLine posts statistics on use of the dispute resolution service that
is a required part of its privacy seal. From January 1, 2000 through March 31,
2000, the program received only six eligible complaints and fifteen ineligible
complaints: it decided three cases. From October 1, 1999 through December
31, 1999, the service received eleven eligible complains and 13 ineligible
complaints: no cases were decided. From July 1, 1999 through September 30,
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Nielsen/NetRatings put TRUSTe in the top ten web advertisers
both for the month of July, 2000, and for the week ending
August 20, 2000. The NetRatings, however, are based solely on
the number of "impressions,, 206 i.e. the number of times one
207
individual has been exposed to one advertisement . An
advertising "impression" does not necessarily fulfill the
dictionary definition of "impression": "a strong effect produced
on the intellect, feelings, conscience, etc." °8 If each advertising
impression produced such a strong mental and emotional
impression on exposed humans, then the threat of manipulation
by anonymous on-line profiling would swamp any positive
benefit produced by the miniature seal programs.2 0 9
1999, BBBOnLine received one eligible and three ineligible complaints; no cases
were decided. The figures for the earliest reported period, March 17, 1999
through June 30, 1999, are one eligible and three ineligible complaints received
and no cases decided. See BBBOnLine, Dispute Resolution
<http://www.bbbonline.org/ reliability/dr.asp> (visited Sept. 8, 2000). All of
these BBBOnLine statistical summaries mentioned hundreds of "inquiries"
unrelated to the privacy program. TRUSTe claims it has "helped thousands of
Web users resolve their privacy complaints." TRUSTe,
<http:www.truste.org/users/ userswatchdogjntro.html> (visited Sept. 7,
2000). I could not, however, find any statistical breakdown on types of "help"
provided, even though TRUSTe had promised to post statistical summaries
twice a year. See TRUSTe, Privacy Seal Program Watchdog Compliance and
Escalation Process Part 7 <http://www.truste.org/users watchdog-intro.html>
(visited Sept. 7, 2000). On Sept. 7, 2000, I emailed TRUSTe for clarification; I
received no response. The dispute resolution information page only lists a
handful of resolutions for privacy problems brought to TRUSTe's attention.
206. See Nielsen/NetRatings <http: //209.249.142.27/nnpm/owa/
NRpublicreports.topadvertisermontly> (visited Aug. 28, 200);
Nielsen /NetRatings
<http: / /209.249.142.27/nnpm/owa/NRpublicreports.topadvertiserweekly>
(visited Aug. 28, 2000).
207. See, e.g., List-Advertising.com, Email List Advertising Terminology
<http://www. list-advertising.com/terms/> (visited Sept. 2, 2000). In Internet
jargon, an "impression" is a "log entry recorded by a web server of the
successful exit of the HTML ad string from the server." Mediaplex, Privacy
Policy <http://www.mediaplex.com/mp/privacy/privacy.html> (visited Sept. 3,
2000).
208. Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 962 (1996). Again, no
one is telling an untruth. The possibly misleading advertising term is an
outgrowth of the printing industry's use of "impression" for the number of times
printing plates have been used to "impress" the same image on different pieces
of paper. Id.
209. See, e.g., Donna L. Hoffman & Thomas P. Novak, When Exposure-Based
Advertising Stops Making Sense (And What CDNOW Did About It) Vand. U. eLab
(2000), available at <http://www2000.osgm.vanderbilt.edu/papers.html>
(explaining that Internet allows consumers to interact with the advertisement,
thus enabling measurement of valuable, active consumer response as opposed
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TRUSTe has publicized the positive results210 of the recently
released study 'Trust in the Wired Americas ',211 by Cheskin
Research.212  Although TRUSTe may have reason to celebrate,
the study fails to demonstrate that TRUSTe has gained the
American public's confidence.2 13  Ignoring the fact that the
sample used is not an accurate representation of the U.S.
population,2 4 the study does not demonstrate confidence in the
privacy protection provided by a TRUSTe seal.
The study merely shows that persons seeing the seal may feel
less uncomfortable. Cheskin reports that American consumers
believe "that there are essentially no rules to the way
information is managed and protected across cyberspace,"
leading to a "heightened sense of risk" for transactions. 2 15 Six
factors allegedly may reduce the perception of risk: (1) a strong
brand identity; (2) easy navigation on the web site; (3) reliable
fulfillment of orders; (4) professional presentation on the web
site; (5) up-to-date technology; and (6) seals of approval.216
to unimportant, passive consumer exposure to the content).
210. TRUSTe, TRUSTe Ranked as the Most Trusted Symbol on the Web,
<http://www. truste.org/about/about-cheskin.html> (visited Sept. 7, 2000).
Please note that while I disagree with TRUSTe about the import of the Cheskin
study, I am not claiming that TRUSTe has made any factually incorrect
statements in its press release.
211. See CHESKIN RESEARCH, supra note 39.
212. Although Cheskin is a for-profit research company, this study was an
in-house project that was not financed by any specific client. See e-mail from
Denise Klarquist, to author (Sept. 9, 2000) (explaining the nature of Cheskin
and the study) (on file with Catholic University Law Review).
213. One public advocacy group reported that an unfair trade practice
complaint had been filed against TRUSTe and AOL. The complaint supposedly
alleges that the TRUSTe seal posted at AOL.com deceives AOL members.
Allegedly, AOL members are in a separate "members" portion of AOL that is not
covered by the TRUSTe approved privacy policy posted at AOL.com. See
Privacy.Net, Unfair Trade Practices Complaint Filed Against Truste/AOL
<http://www.privacy.net/truste.asp> (visited Sept. 12, 2000).
214. Average income of participants was over $40,000, average age was 38,
61% of the those sampled spend more than 10 hours a week on-line, and 75%
had made at least one purchase on line. According to the U.S. Census Bureau's
1999 figures, less than 50% of Americans 18 or older have any Internet access,
and those with access are more likely than the general population to be
employed full time and to have attended college. Almost 60% of Americans over
18 have household incomes under $50,000, and only 32% of Americans over 18
with Internet access have household incomes under $50,000. United States
Census Bureau, 1999 Statistical Abstract of the United States, available at
<http: //www.census.gov/statab/freq/99s0923.txt>.
215. CHESKIN RESEARCH, supra note 39, at 7.
216. Id. But see Hoffman, et al., supra note 209 (arguing that only opt-in
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Notice that brands comes first and seals of approval last.217 This
is not much help for smaller e-businesses. Study subjects were
shown pictures of five seals: Visa, MasterCard, TRUSTe,
VeriSign,1 8 and BBBOnLine. The subjects were asked if they
"had seen" the seals. In the United States, 89% had seen Visa's
seal, 69% TRUSTe's, 63% MasterCard's, 59% VeriSign's, and
18% BBBOnLine's. 2 '9  Few subjects, however, had read the
privacy statements associated with the symbols.22 °
Subjects were not asked if seeing one of these symbols made
them feel safe-as to privacy or any other concern. They were
asked if posting these symbols increased the trustworthiness of
a web site. Here TRUSTe earned 55% in the United States,
BBBOnLine 40%, Visa 38%, VeriSign 38%, and MasterCard
27%--a giant improvement for TRUSTe over 1999.221 As for the
information policies will produce consumer trust). "A whopping 87% of Web
users think that they should have "complete control" over the demographic
information Web sites capture and over 71% believe there should be new laws
to protect their privacy online." Id. at 3.
217. This claim is supported by statistics showing that the leaders in on-line
income are well established, well known firms, as opposed to start up
companies. See Mark Roberti & Eileen Buckley, Hey, Profits!, THE INDUSTRY
STANDARD, Sept. 11, 2000, at 58. An older study was somewhat more
supportive of seal organizations. See Lorrie Faith Cranor, Joseph Reagle, &
Mark S. Ackerman, Beyond Concern: Understanding Net Users' Attitudes About
Online Privacy (AT&T Labs-Research Technical Report TR 99.4.3; issued April
1999), available at
<http: / /www.research.att.com/resources/trs/TRs/99/99.4/99. .4.3/report.
htm>. This AT&T study involved questionnaires filled out during November
1998 by less than 400 heavy Internet users. See id. at 2. Taken separately,
known firm names were much more important to the privacy-interested than
were seals or posted privacy policies; however, a site that had both a posted
privacy policy and a seal (from a very well known organization) was rated about
as trustworthy as one covered by a privacy statute. See id. at 10-11, 15.
218. VeriSign, Inc., headquartered in California, specializes in secure
electronic payment and verification systems. See VeriSign, Inc., Corporate
Overview <http://www. verisign.com/investor/overview.html> (visited Sept. 8,
2000). Along with the American Institute of Public Accountants, VeriSign
provides eligible web sites with the WebTrust seal. This seal is only partially
related to privacy issues; seal holders must pay for CPAs to audit their
compliance with posted business polices including billing, fulfillment, and
privacy integrity. No sign is issued solely upon privacy procedures. See
VeriSign, VeriSign Secure Server Ids for the WebTrust Program.
<http://www.verisign.com/webtrust/overview. html> (visited Sept. 8, 2000).
219. CHESKIN RESEARCH, supra note 39, at 19-20.
220. See id. at 20 (indicating percentages of participants who actually read
the different companies' privacy statements: Visa 27%; TRUSTe 25%, VeriSign
21%, MasterCard 15%, BBBOnLine 10%).
221. See id. at 21. The 1999 figures in the United States were VeriSign 25%,
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"most trustworthy" sites, subjects were not prompted. Picks
included over 600 different sites, none of which were mentioned
222by over 15% of respondents. In the United States, the seven
most frequently "trusted" were (in descending order): Yahoo!,
Amazon, Hotmail/MSN, eBay, AOL, iwon, and Microsoft.
223
Again, remember the question asked; "most trusted" is a
comparative; the "most trusted" may be perceived as the best of
a very bad lot.
How you view the results of the 2000 Cheskin study depends
on your goal. If you want to lull consumers into going online to
shop at the lowest cost to business, the news that people
respond somewhat to familiar symbols, even without knowing
the policies the symbols stand for, is good news. If you want to
assure privacy, as requested by a supermajority of the United
States public, the news means that the market by itself is
extremely unlikely to produce an acceptable Internet. Not
enough people seem to invest enough time to read the small
print. Yahoo!, for example, is the most trusted site in the United
States. My tedious investigation of Yahoo!'s third party
advertising services, however, shows this trust is somewhat
misplaced.
As to remedies, BBBOnLine may order an offender to correct
its action. If the offender does not comply, BBBOnLine may
cancel the seal, publicize the problem, or refer the offense to a
224government agency. BBBOnLine's own dispute resolution
process is unable to direct an offending seal member to pay
125money damages. Similarly, PrivacyBot's and TRUSTe's
ultimate sanctions are publicity, seal cancellation, and referral
226to appropriate government agencies. Even the safe harbor
BBBOnLIne 16%, MasterCard 13%, Visa 11%, and TRUSTe 9%. Id.
222. These two figures are for the entire study that included South America.
The study did not break out figures for the United. States. Id. at 29.
223. Id.
224. BBBOnLine, How the Privacy Program Works
<http://www.bbbonline.org/ businesses/privacy/self-regulation.html> (visited
Aug. 10 2000).
225. See BBBOnLine, Privacy Program Dispute Resolution Processes
Procedures, Privacy Policy Review Service and Privacy Review Appeals Board,
available at <http://www.bbbonline.org> (visited Aug. 10, 2000).
226. See PrivacyBot.com, About PrivacyBot
<http://www.privacybot.com/about.shtm> (visited Aug. 27, 2000). PrivacyBot
uses non-binding mediation in its dispute resolution service. See id.; see also
TRUSTe, Frequently Asked Questions: How Does TRUSTe ensure that Web Sites
Stick to Their Privacy Polices? <http://www.truste.org/users/users-faqs.html>
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agreement that the United States negotiated with the EU does
not require monetary remedies for violations,22 despite the fact
that the EU Directive requires member states to enact national
legislation to enable individuals to sue for monetary damages.228
The difference is not based on public opinion; the United States
public endorses strong penalties. 229  As the Internet industry
recognizes, government enforcement means less enforcement;
the government simply has too few regulators.23 °
Seal organizations are insufficient, furthermore, because they
do not require enough. Even though the majority of Americans
do not know the extent of the information collection routinely
performed on-line, Americans want better privacy protection
than is necessary to qualify for a BBBOnLine or TRUSTe privacy
seal. They also want better privacy policies than that promised
by the NAI. Some 87% of Americans want "complete control" of
online information collection.232 If Americans knew more about
technological capabilities, more Americans might favor strong
privacy rights. NAI's privacy policy has been discussed in detail
above. Although the specifics are more complex, the essence of
both the BBBOnLine and TRUSTe seal programs is following a
posted privacy policy, not keeping out of the information
collection business.
(visited Sept. 7, 2000).
227. "Sanctions must be sufficiently rigorous to ensure compliance by
organizations" but damages are only required "where the applicable law or
private sector initiatives so provide." U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Safe Harbor
Privacy Principles (July 21, 2000), available at
<http: //www.ita.doc.gov/td/ecom/shprinciplesfmal.thm>.
228. EC Directive, Chapter III, art. 24.
229. Asked to choose only one from a list of possible penalties for an Internet
company that used personal information in ways that it said it would not, 11%
of respondents wanted the company's owners put in jail, 27% wanted the
company's owners fined, 26% wanted the site shut down, and 30% wanted the
site placed on a list of fraudulent sites. See Pew Project, supra note 79, at 29
(Aug. 20, 2000).
230. See, e.g., Profiling Workshop, supra note 17, at 123, 167 (remarks of
Dan Jaffee, Association of National Advertisers, that government should want
self-regulation because the FTC and the Department of Commerce have
insufficient staff to control industry behavior).
231. Only 43% of American Internet users know what a cookie is, only 51%
of American Internet users who have clicked on an ad know what a cookie is,
and only 56% of American Internet users who have bought a product on-line
know what a cookies is. See Pew Project, supra note 79, at 8. Only 75% of
people who have heard of cookies have even a "basic" understanding of how
they work. See Online Profiling Part 2, supra note 17, at 11-12.
232. See Hoffman, et al., supra note 209, at 3.
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What does the American public want? According to the Pew
Internet & American Life Project a vast majority of Americans
want a presumption of privacy when they are on-line.23 Opt-in
choice is demanded by 86%; 54% consider on-line tracking a
harmful invasion of privacy.234 Over 90% of Americans are
concerned about privacy, and well over 75% are "seriously
concerned." 23- DoubleClick, the mammoth on-line advertising
firm, sponsored a 1999 study conducted by privacy expert Dr.
Alan A. Westin.236  Although survey respondents were not
qualified by knowledge about on-line snooping and possible data
consolidation 23 7 "a solid .. . 32 to 49 percent ... would not be
willing to give or have their personal information collected for
various types of banner ad personalization."238 Those willing to
allow tracking for the purpose of on-line advertisement targeting
were strongly concerned that the information not be used for
other purposes, not be shared with other entities, and be
editable by its subjects. 9
In sum, the seal organizations are some improvement for
people who want information about data collection. The seal
organization may eventually satisfy the needs of that portion of
the population willing to trade information for access. 20  The
organizations do not, however, provide the private spot desired
by at least a substantial minority of Americans. Opt-in
Government could provide such a safe spot.
III. THE EXAMPLE: OPT-IN GOVERNMENT TO ALLOW ON-LINE PRIVACY
American citizens and the federal government should want
more Americans on the Internet, not just to grow ecommerce,
but to grow informed citizens. In the words of James Madison,
233. See Pew Project, supra note 79, at 2.
234. See id.
235. Id. at 97-98.
236. See Profiling Workshop, supra note 17, at 104-05.
237. Id. at 118-19. The subjects were presumably unaware that ad-targeting
profiles include psychological factors involving emotional vulnerabilities. See
id. at 122-23, 127 (remarks of Jeff Chester, Executive Director of the Center for
Media Education, referring to the Navient Company's self-description).
238. Id. at 110.
239. See id. at 112-13.
240. See Hoffman, et al., supra note 209, at 4 ("[C]onsumers do not view their
personal data in the context of an economic exchange for information, as many
commercial Web providers believe." (emphasis in original)).
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"knowledge will forever govern ignorance; [a] popular government
without popular information . .. or the means of acquiring it is
but a prologue to a farce or tragedy or perhaps both."2 41 The
Internet has already become an important information resource
242to the vast majority of people with access.
Finding even non-commercial information on-line, however,
can be hazardous to your privacy. Even if the site you are
looking for does not plant cookies or bristle with advertisements
that do, you need to find the right site. Most search engines are
prime Internet advertising space 24 3 shadowed by multiple third
party advertisement vendors-as my investigation of Yahoo!
illustrates. To feel safe to look for information, you need to be
able to find the site you want without using an advertising-
supported search engine. You also need to know that you will
not waste your time (or lose your privacy) by inadvertently
following a search engine result hyperlink onto a site that
contains cookies.24 4 After you get to a site, you need to know
when a hyperlink is leading you off safe territory.
This is a job for "Opt-In Government."
The federal government should establish a private zone on the
Internet by setting up a search engine that will only link to web
sites providing the highest level of privacy. Let us dub this site
PrivateSearch.gov. 245  Only the federal government has a high
enough profile to be visible to Internet surfers most at risk: the
241. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Berry (Aug. 4, 1822), reprinted
in JAMES MADISON, THE COMPLETE MADISON 337 (Saul K. Padover. ed., 1953).
242. See Harlan Lebo, UCLA Report Finds Internet Surpasses Television as
Key Information Source (Aug. 15, 2000) available at,
<http://www.uclanews.ucla.edu/docs/ lshl.379.html> (visited Aug. 26 2000).
243. Several entities provide "anonymous" searching of various kinds. See,
e.g., Anonymizer <http://www.anonymizer.com> (visited Sept. 29, 2000);
Topclick <http://www. topclick.com> (visited Sept. 29, 2000).
244. The FTC has a set of very cute pages discussing "kidz" privacy issues.
See FTC <http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/edcams/kidzprivacy/index.html>
(visited Sept. 8, 2000). Seamlessly linked to the FTC material, and marked with
the FTC's kidzprivacy cartoon, is a "kidz" search engine page. See Lycoszone
<http://www.lycoszone.com/parentszn.html> (visited Sept. 8, 2000). The
search engine is actually a commercially-run page and is not subject to the FTC
privacy policy. See e-mail from FTC webmaster to author (Sept. 3, 2000) (on file
with author).
245. My browser reported no active URL at privatesearch.gov or
privatesearch.org. A consumer activist site lives at Privacy.net. Privacy.net:
The Consumer Information Organization <http://www.privacy.net> (visited
Sept. 8, 2000).
20011 699
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 50:647
nontechnological, rushed Internet users. Only the federal
government can provide sufficiently rigorous penalties for
privacy violations .246
Cost is not prohibitive compared to other government projects.
List price for an Internet search engine is about (1) $300,000 a
year for indexing the first one million pages; (2) $100,000 for
each additional million pages indexed; and (3) four dollars per
1000 queries run. Substantial volume discounts are usually
negotiated.247 In comparison, the Privacy Commission Act would
have appropriated $2,500,000 for a report on privacy, which
would merely discuss the problem. 248  The Constitution allows
exclusive rights to authors and inventors in order to "promote
the progress of science and the useful arts',24 9 by creating
material for public use. 250  The fees that intellectual property
holders pay to the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), therefore,
would be singularly appropriate to partially underwrite public
access to information on the Internet.251
Private foundations might help fund PrivateSearch.gov. The
Federal Search Foundation, founded by Dr. Eric Brewer, is
building a search engine for the federal government to provide
252better access to government supplied information. Access is
246. This proposal is not based on some pre-Nixon trust in government
honesty, but only government action seems capable of producing such a private
spot. Private causes of action, furthermore, would help police the privacy
police. A non-profit foundation would be a second-best host: an entity with a
relatively high profile and presumptive honesty. Enforcement, however, would
still be a problem. I thank David E. Sorkin for this suggestion.
247. Telephone interview with industry source (Sept. 7, 2000).
248. Privacy Commission Act, H.R. 4049 § 9(a) (2000).
249. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (the Intellectual Property Clause).
250. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980) (stating that
patent power is intended to encourage a positive effect on society).
251. The PTO is entirely funded by fees and routinely collects more than the
federal budget allows it to spend. See, e.g., 1999 USPTO Annual Report 4, 28
available at <http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/ 1999/>
[hereinafter USPTO Report]. Budget projections for 2001 are that the PTO will
collect $1.2 billion, however, they will only be allowed to spend seventy-five
percent of this sum. See Letter from Q. Todd Dickinson (Undersecretary of
Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the U.S. PTO) to Hon.
Howard Coble and Howard Berman (ranking members of the House
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property) (June 9, 2000), available at
<http://www.uspto.gov/2001budget.html>.
252. See The Federal Search Foundation <http://www.fed-search.org/>
(visited Sept. 12, 2000). The search engine will give access to 20,000
government web sites involving 27 million pages. See Spenser Hsu, New Site
700
Opt-In Government
private.23 Access is free not only to citizens, but to independent
web entities that promise not to track individual actions on the
site.
254
PrivateSearch.gov could operate by searching only those sites
registered with the search engine.2f If a company desires its site
to be included, the company could file a brief declaration stating
that: (1) it did not collect or use any of its visitors' information
except to answer inquiries from those visitors or to complete
transactions requested by those visitors; (2) it shared such
information only with third parties needed to complete the
transaction, such as UPS, who used it for no other purpose; (3)
the information was discarded after its use; and (4) hyperlinks
leading to independent sites are clearly marked. Any violations
would be punishable. I suggest that harmed visitors have
private causes of action for injunction, compensatory and
256statutory damages , and attorney's fees. States' attorneys
general and the FTC should have the power to sue for criminal
penalties. These remedies largely parallel the EC Directive.
The government could charge a modest fee for handling each
registration. Yahoo! and other commercial search engines, after
all, charge fees to web sites for accelerated or higher quality
Streamlines Online Government: Powerful Search Engine Links Thousands of
Internet Pates in One Location, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2000. The engine will be
able to handle over 100 million queries each day. See id. The government has
procured a three-year maintenance contract for $4.1 million dollars. See
id. and Washington Post Correction, Sept. 26, 2000.
253. Only publicly available documents will be used in this search, and there
will be no tracking of personal user information of any kind. Aggregate web site
metrics, such as traffic loads and bandwidth measurements, will be used to
improve the quality of both the search experience and the overall user
experience. See The Federal Search Foundation: The Engine Behind E-
Government: Most Often Asked Questions and Answers at Q.7 (Sept. 22, 2000
briefing material provided to author by Christina Peterson, Federal Search
Foundation). This site was in operation at <http://www.firstgov.gov> when this
article went to press. See <http://www.firstgov.gov> (visited Apr. 18, 2001).
The site's privacy policy, however, collects allegedly non-PII to which I object-
visitors' IP addresses and the page from which you linked. See id.
254. See id. at Q.9. Linking entities, called certified partners, must also
promise to respect the data's integrity, attribute the information to the
government, provide free access, not associate "inappropriate" material, and
establish methods for "user feedback." Id.
255. Alternatively, the engine could discard all located sites that lacked a
certificate or token issued by the government entity running PrivateSearch.gov.
256. Class actions for statutory damages might be expressly allowed, and
whistle blower protection would also be helpful.
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indexing.257 Registration would be effective for a stated time,
such as one year. If the registration was not renewed, the site
would be dropped from PrivateSearch.gov. A site could exit the
system at any time by filing a certificate. Filings could be done
on-line.25 8 The government could underwrite indexing certain
public service sites, perhaps public libraries, museums, or local
government material. A registered site would have the right to
state this on its site, thus reassuring persons who reached the
site independently of PrivateSearch.gov.
Small businesses would benefit greatly from such a system.
No available seal promises consumers such a high level of
privacy. No available seal projects as much clout with the public
as the trademarks of major businesses. 2 " Nor are the major
seals tied to search engines. Many small businesses may be
following high quality privacy practices, but have no affordable
260way of informing interested potential customers.
This government project would not intrude on the
unconcerned. Consumers who want to trade content or price for
personal information would be free to do so. Companies that
want to use cookie-directed advertising would remain free to do
so. Persons and companies, however, who want to act on the
highest privacy level would also be empowered, unlike non-
techies under the current self-regulatory system.
PrivateSearch.gov, furthermore, would provide a way of
empirically testing American's feelings about privacy. We would
finally be able to vote for privacy with our computer mice.
257. The Yahoo! fee is about $199. See James Fallows, Searching for
Revenue THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, Sept. 4, 2000, at 51, 52. Yahoo! also markets
higher visibility on its portal. See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, Bookseller and
Yahoo to Announce Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2000, available at
<http: / /www. nytimes.com/2000/09/ 19/technology/ 19book.html> (discussing
contracts between Yahoo and Barnesandnoble.com, Amazon.com, Costco,
Spiegel.com, and Kmart Corporation's Bluelight.com). Some of these contracts
involve free Internet service for consumers. See id.
258. Trademark registrations have been electronically filable since 1998. See
USPTO Report, supra note 251, at 5.
259. Some businesses have hired auditing firms to certify compliance with
posted privacy policies, but this Is quite expensive. For example, the travel site
Expedia.com allegedly paid PricewaterhouseCoopers a six-figure fee. See
Tedeschi, supra note 203, at 2. Apparently, only some 200 companies have
gone this route. See id, at 3.
260. PlumbingWorld.com guarantees absolute privacy; however, it does not
post a privacy seal. Plumbingworld.com <http://www.plumbingworld.com>
(visited Sept. 3, 2000).
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